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June 16, 2017 
Charlie Savage 
clo The New York Times 
1627 I Street, NW, ?th Floor 
Washington, DC 20006 
Dear Mr. Savage, 
NArlOl'Al ARUilVl~ JnJ RKOROS ADMIN IHRATION 
~l AOlll'lll ROA() COlllLOI l'ARI-. MD10740t.001 NATIONAL 
..,.,.,._,1rrl11rcs.g~1· A RCI 11 V ES 
I am writing in response to your Freedom of Information Act request of May 18, 2017 for records 
in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration. Your request was received in 
this office on the same date and assigned FOIA case tracking number 53042. 
You requested access to the draft indictment of President Bill Clinton and related documents that 
provide legal analysis on the ques1ion of whether a sitting President may be indicted, found in the 
Records of Independent Counsels Kenneth Starr and Robert Ray. 
I have conducted a preliminary assessment of the entries you identified from the OIC file manifest 
and have confirmed the responsiveness of the following files: 
486 DC, Paul Rosenzweig Attorney Work Files: 2. William Jefferson Clinton Indictment 
232 DC, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files: 6. Presidential lndictability 
232 DC, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files: 7. Project Idaho 
405 DC, John Bowler Attorney Work Files: 2. DOJ Brief - Indictment After Impeachment 
405 DC, John Bowler Attorney Work Files: 15. WJC Status Memorandum 
405 DC, John Bowler Attorney Work Files: 16. WJC Status Memo Supplemental Materials 
All of these records, with the exception of the file titled DOJ Brief - Indictment After Impeachment, 
require screening fair categories of information exempted from disclosure under the terms of the 
Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552), prior to public release. In particular, documents may be 
redacted to preserve the secrecy of grand jury proceedings pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Requests for investigative files that do not exceed 500 pages are assigned to our first-tier 
processing queue. Taking into consideration our existing backlog, the estimated time required to 
complete the processing of your request is approximately 24 months from the date of this letter. 
To notify this office of ~n your contact information or to track the status of your request, 
please telephone 301.-..or e-mail specialaccess foia@nara.gov. If you h~c 
questions regarding the subject of your request, please contact me directly at 301- or 
1 
Appeared in the New York Times on July 22, 2017.
~· All communications concerning this request should reference FOIA case 
tracking number 53042. 
If you are not satisfied with our action on this request and would like the opportunity to discuss our 
response, you may contact our FOIA Public Liaison for assistance: 
Sincerely, 
Accessioned Executive Branch Records - Washington, DC Area 
FOIA Requester Service Center: 301-837-3190 
FOIA Public Liaison: Martha Wagner Murphy 
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500 
College Park, MD 20740-6001 
Telephone: 301 -
E-mail: dc.foia.liaison@nara.gov 
~~~ 
ROBERT REED 
Archivist 
Special Access and FOIA Staff 
2 
July 10, 2017 
N1\TIONAL ARCMIV[S ~nJ RECORDS AOMIN ISl RA I ION 
8601 ADlLl'H l ROAD COLUGL l'ARI<. MC> 207·10 <>001 
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Charlie Savage 
c/o The New York Times 
1627 I Street, NW, ?th Floor 
Washington, DC 20006 
Dear Mr. Savage, 
I am writing in further response to your Freedom of Information Act request of May 18, 2017 for 
records in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration. Your request was 
received in this office on the same date and assigned FOIA case tracking number 53042. 
I have completed a line-by-line review of four documents found in the Records of Independent 
Counsels Kenneth Starr and Robert Ray and released information to the greatest extent possible. 
Two pages have been redacted to protect the personal privacy of living individuals per 5 USC 552 
{b){6) and {b){7){C) and to protect information derived from documents filed under seal with the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. A summary of the results of this review is 
provided below: 
DC box 405, John Bowler Attorney Work Files, DOJ Brief -- Indictment after 
Impeachment, Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, August 18, 2000 (51 pages released in full). 
DC box 232, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files, Presidential lndictability, Draft 
Memorandum from Ronald D. Rotunda, May 13, 1998 (56 pages; 54 pages 
released in full and 2 pages released in redacted form). 
DC box 232, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files, Project Idaho, Memorandum from 
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 
September 24, 1973 (41 pages released in full). 
DC box 232, Jay Apperson Attorney Work Files, Project Idaho, Memorandum from 
Robert M. Bork, Solicitor General of the United States, October 5, 1973 (23 pages 
released in full). 
This concludes the processing of the expedited portion of your request. If you have questions 
concerning my review of these documents or would like to make arrangements to receive copies, 
please contact me directly at~ or 301- . 
1 
If you are not satisfied with my action on this request, you have the right to file an administrative 
appeal within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of this letter. Appeals must be in writing and 
may be delivered by regular U.S. mail or by e-mail. By filing an appeal, you preserve your rights 
under the Freedom of Information Act and present the deciding agency with an opportunity to 
review your request and reconsider its decision. If you submit your appeal by regular mail, it 
should be addressed to the Deputy Archivist of the United States {ND), National Archives and 
Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road, Room 4200, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001. 
Both the letter and envelope should be clearly marked "FOIA Appeal." If you submit your appeal 
by e-mail, please send it to foia@nara.gov, addressed to the Deputy Archivist, with the words 
"FOIA Appeal" in the subject line. Please be certain to explain why you believe this response does 
not meet the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. All communications concerning this 
request should referience FOIA case tracking number 53042. 
If you would like the opportunity to discuss our response and attempt to resolve your dispute 
without initiating the appeals process, you may contact our FOIA Public Liaison for assistance: 
Accessioned Executive Branch Records - Washington, DC Area 
FOIA Requester Service Center: 301-837-3190 
FOIA Public Liaison: Martha Wagner Murphy 
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 5500 
College Park, MD 20740-6001 
Telephone: 301-
E-ma.il: dc.foia.liaison@nara.gov 
If you are unable to resolve your dispute through our Public Liaison, the Office of Government 
Information Services {OGIS) is the federal FOIA ombudsman. OGIS offers mediation services to 
help resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and federal agencies. You may contact OGIS at 
the following address: 
Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) 
National Archives and Records Administration 
8601 Adelphi Road, Room 2510 
College Park, MD 20740-6001 
ogis@nara.gov 
202-7 41-5770 
1-877-684-6448 
Sincerely, 
~dt'i' 
ROBERT REED 
Archivist 
Special Access and FOIA Staff 
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Screened by NARA (RD-F) July 10, 2017 
FOIA # 53042 (URTS 16018) 
DOCID: 70102162 
RONALD 0 . ROTUNDA 
TH£Al8EkTE JENNE!?, Jk. Pl?OF£SSOl?OFLAW 
PHONE; (21 7) 333-3459 
FAX: (217J 244-1478 
EMAIL: rrotundo@law.uiuc.edu 
May 13, 1998 
The Honorable Kenneth W_ Starr 
Independent Counsel 
Office of the Independent Counsel 
1001 Pennsylvania Ave .. N.W. 
Suite 490 North 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
Re: lNDICTABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 
Dear Judge Starr: 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
504 E. PENNSYLVANIA AVE. 
CHAMPAIGN!, IL 618~996 
HOME PAGE: http://W)NW.uiuc.edu/ph/www/rrotundo 
You have asked my legal opinion as to whether a sitting President is subject 
to indictment.1 Does the Constitution immunize a President from being indicted for 
criminal activities while serving in the office of President? For example, if the 
President committed a crime before assuming office, does his election to the 
Presidency immunize his criminal activities? If the President in his private capacity 
commits one or more crimes while in office, does his election serve to immunize him? 
In short, is a sitting President above the criminal law? 
As this opinion letter makes clear, I conclude that, in the circumstances of this 
case, President. Clinton is subject to indictment and criminal prosecution, although 
it may be the case that he could not be imprisoned (assuming that he is convicted and 
that imprisonment is the appropriate punishment) until after he leaves that office. 
A criminal prosecution and conviction (with imprisonment delayed) does not, in the 
For your information, I am attaching a resume listing my publications. 
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1 words of Nixon v. Sirica, 2 "compete with the impeachment device by working a 
2 constructive removal of the President from office." 
3 
4 In addition, I express no opinion as to whether a prosecution by state 
5 authorities may be proper (a state prosecution may violate the Supremacy Clause). 
6 Nor do l consider whether the President could be indicted if there were no 
7 Independent Counsel statute. In the circumstances of this case, there is such a 
8 statute, and it was enacted as the specific request of President Clinton, who knew -
9 at the time he lobbied for and signed the legislation - that a specific purpose of the 
10 statute was to investigate criminal allegations involving him .. He welcomed the 
11 independent investigation so that it could clear the air. 
12 
13 In addition, as discussed below, I express no opinion as to whether the Federal 
14 ·Government could indict a President for allegations that involve his official duties as 
15 President. The Office of Independent Counsel is investigating allegations that do not 
16 involve any official duties of President Clinton. The counts of an indictment against 
17 President Clinton would include serious allegations involving witness tampering, 
18 document destruction, perjury, subornation .of perjury, obstruction of justice,. 
19 conspiracy, .and illegal pay-offs; these counts in no way relate to the President 
20 Clinton's official duties, even though some of the alleged violations occurr~d after he 
21 became President. The allegations involved here do not involve any sort of policy 
22 dispute between the President and Congress. The allegations, in short, do not relate 
23 to the President's official duties; they are not "within the outer perimeter of his 
24 official responsitbility."3 Indeed, the alleged acts involved here are not only outside 
25 the outer perimeter of the President's official responsibility. they are contrary to the 
26 President's official responsibility to take care that the law be faithfully executed. 
27 
28 Also, as discussed below, a grand jury indictment is not inconsistent in present 
29 circumstances with the conclusion reached by the Watergate Special Prosecutor.4 For 
30 example, in the present case (and unlike the Watergate situation) a criminal 
31 prosecution would not duplicate any impeachment proceeding already begun in the 
2 487 F.2d 700, 7ll(D.C: Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (en bane). President Nixon chose 
not to seek U.S. Supreme Court review of this decision. Instead he fired Watergate Special 
Prosecutor Archibald Cox. 
3 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2704, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 
(1982). 
I should disclose that I was Assistant Majority Counsel to the Senate Watergate · 
Committee. 
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1 House of Representatives. 5 In the Watergate era, the House of Representatives had 
2 - prior to the time that Special ·Prosecutor Leon Jaworski turned over any 
3 information to the House Impeachment Inquiry - already made the independent 
4 decision to begin, and, in fact, had begun impeachment proceedings_ In the present 
5 case, no House Impeachment Inquiry has begun, and, if one were to begin, it would 
6 only be ,because the House of Representatives would be responding to information 
7 that the Office of Independent Counsel would transfer to the House of 
8 Representatives;. Watergate Prosecutor Jaworski, in short. did not want to preempt 
9 the House inqtiiry that had independently begun. Now, there is no House inquiry. 
10 and the OIC would not be preempting any House inquiry. While the Independent 
11 Counsel statute authorizes the OIC to transmit relevant information to the House. 
12 the statute does even suggest that the OIC must postpone any indictment until the 
13 House and Senate shave have concluded any impeachment inquiry. 
14 
15 In this country, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the state 
16 that no one is "above the law.''6 The Constitution grants no one immunity from the 
!i See LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER 100 (1976). Watergate 
Prosecutor Jaworski's views are discussed below. One should also note that, in the present 
case, the House might not see fit to begin an impeachment, or it might decide that the alleged 
violations of law do not merit removal from office, either because some acts occurred prior to 
the time of President Clinton's assumption of office or because they do not rise to the level of 
impeachable offences. 
As. Justice Joseph Story has noted: "There is also much force in the remark that an 
impeachment is a proceeding purely of a political nature. It t.ouches neither his person, nor his 
property; but simply divests him of his political capacity." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONITTITUTION, §§ 406, at p. 289 (RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds., Carolina 
Academic Press, 1987, originally published, 1833). 
6 E.g., Unired States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196. 220, 1 S.Ct. 240, 260, 27 L.Ed. 171 
(1882); Unit.ed States v. United Mine Workers of AmerU:a, 330 U.S. 258, 343, 67 S.Ct. 677, 720, 
91L .. Ed.884 (1947); Ma/,one v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 651, 82 S.Ct. 980, 986, 8 L.Ed.2d 168 
(1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mawne v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 651, 82 S.Ct. 980, 986, 
8 L.Ed.2d 168 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting);Johnson v. Powell, 393 U.S. 920, 89 S.Ct. 250, 
251, 21L.Ed.2d255 (1968)(Memorandum Opinion of Douglas, J., regarding application for a 
stay); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 699, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2665, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); 
Grauel v. UniU!d States., 408 U.S. 606, 615, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); UniU!d 
States u. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3111, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Butz u. 
Econorrwu, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894,2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Davis u. Passman, 
442 U.S. 228, 246, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 2277, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 731, 758 & n. 41, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2705 & n.41, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982); Briscoe v. 
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1127, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Unit.ed States u .. 
(continued ... ) 
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1 criminal laws. Congress enacted the present law governing the appointment of 
2 Independent Counsel, at the specific request of President Clinton and Attorney 
3 General Janet Reno. All of the parties - the President, the Attorney General, 
4 Congress - knew that the specific and immediate purpose of this statute would 
5 result in the appointment of an Independent Counsel to investigate certain 
6 allegations of criminal activities that appeared to implicate the President of the 
:7 United States and the First Lady. Since that time, the Attorney General has, on 
g several occasions, successfully urged the Court to expand the jurisdiction of this 
9 particular Office of Independent Counsel (hereinafter, .. OIC") to include other 
10 allegations involving the President and Mrs. Clinton. 
11 
12 As the judiciary has noted in the past, the President "does not embody the 
13 nation's sovereignty. He is not above the law's commands .... "7 The people "do not 
14 forfeit through elections the right to have the law construed against and applied to 
15 every citizen. Nor does the Impeachment Clause imply immunity from routine court 
16 process."8 
17 
18 In the remainder of this opinion letter I examine the case law, the legal 
19 commentators, the history and language of the relevant Constitutional provisions, the 
20 legislative history of the Independent Counsel law, the logic and structure of our 
21 Constitution, and the laws governing the Grand Jury's power to investigate and 
22 indict. As discussed in detail below, if the Constitution really provides that the 
23 President must be impeached before he can be prosecuted for breaking the criminal 
24 law - even if the President commits a crime prior to the time he became President., 
25 or if he commits a crime in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity as 
26 President -, the our Constitution has created serious anomalies. 
27 
28 First, it is quite clear that a President may be impeached for actions that do 
6 ( ..• continued) 
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 706, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 3076, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987)Brennan, J .. joined by 
Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 103 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1146 n . 2, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996)(Souter, J., joined by 
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.); Clinton v. Jones, - U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1645, 
137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). 
7 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 at 711 (footnote omitted). 
8 Nixon u. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 711 (per curiam) (en bane) (footnote 
omitted)(emphasis added). 
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1 not violate any criminal statute.11 Acts that (a) constitute impeachable offenses and 
2 (b) are violations of a crime created by statute (our Constitution recognizes no 
3 common law crimes) are two different categories of acts. Moreover, if the President 
4 does commit a crime, that does not necessarily mean that ·he must be impeached, 
5' because some crimes do not merit impeachment and removal from office. 
6 
:J For example, if the President in a moment of passion slugs an irritating 
8 heckler, he has committed a criminal battery. But no one would suggest that the 
9 President should be removed from office simply because of that assault. Yet, the 
10 President has no right to assault. hecklers.10 If there is no recourse against the 
11 President, if he cannot be prosecuted for violating the criminal laws, he will be above 
12 the law. Clinton v. Jones rejected such an immunity; instead, it emphatically agreed 
13 with the Eight Circuit that: "the President, like other officials, is subject to the same 
14 laws that apply to all citizens."11 The "rationale for official immunity 'is inapposite 
15 where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue."'12 The President has 
16 no immunity in such a case. If the Constitution prevents the President from being 
17 indicood for violations of one or more federal criminal statutes, even if those statutory 
18 violations are not impeachable offences, then the Constitution authorizes the 
19 President to be above the law. But the Constitution creates an Executive Branch 
20 with the President under a sworn obligation to faithfully executive the law. The 
21 Constitution does not create an absolute Monarch above the law. 
22 
23 In addition, as also discuss~d below, if the President must be impeached prior 
24 to being prosecuted for serious violations of the criminal law, then Congress would 
25 have the final determination of when a criminal prosecution must begin. But it 
26 violates the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers for the legislative branch of 
27 government to control when (or if) a criminal prosecution may.occur. It would even 
28 violate the Separation of Powers if Congress were to make the decision of the 
9 See, e.g., JOSEPH S'I'ORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSI'ITUTION, §§ 405, . at p. 288 
(RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds., Carolina Academic Press. 1987, originally 
published, 1833): "Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion that no previous 
statute is necessary to authorize any impeachment of any official misconduct .... " 
1° Cf. Gary Borg, Chreti.en U; Charged Bri.e{ly with Assault, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1996, 
at AlO, avai/,abk in 1996 WE.srLAw 2669290 (reporting that the Canadian Prime Minister -
the first time this century that a sitting Canadian Prime Minister was faced with criminal 
charges - was charged with assault for grabbing a protester by the throat; the charge was 
later quashed). 
It 
- U.S. - , 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1638. (1997). 
12 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1641 (quoting Eight Circuit)(emphasis added). 
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I Attorney General to refuse to seek (or to seek) the appointment of an independent 
2 counsel subject to judicial review. 13 
3 
4 Moreover, as the case law discussed below indicates, if the Grand Jury cannot 
S indict the President, it cannot constitutionally investigate him. But, in Morrison v. 
6 Olson14 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel 
·: 7 Act and the constitutionality of grand jury investigations under the direction of an 
8 Independent Counsel appointed by the court. Morrison implicitly decided the issue 
9 analyzed in this opinion letter. 
10 
11 The Constitution does grant limited immunity to federal legislators in certain 
12 limited contexts, as discussed below, but those immunities do not exempt Senators 
13 or Representatives from the application of the criminal laws. One looks in vain to 
14 find any textual support in the Constitution for any Presidential immunity (either 
13 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). The 
Court made it quite clear that it was necessary, in order to save the constitutionality of the 
Independent Counsel statute, for the Court to conclude that it gave neither Congress nor the 
Special Division any power to force the Attorney General to appoint an Independent Counsel 
nor any power to direct or supervise the Independent Counsel once the appointment took place. 
For example. the Court in Morrison also said: "[T]he Special Division has no power ro appoint 
an independent counsel sua sponte; it may do so upon the specific request of the Attorney 
General, and the courts are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General's 
decision not to seek appointment." 487 U.S. at 695, 108 S.Ct. at 2621. As to Congress, the 
Court said: "The Act does empower certain Members of Congress to request the Attorney 
General to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel, but the Attorney General has 
no duty to comply with the request, although he must respond within a certain time limit." 487 
U.S. at 694, 108 S.Ct. at 2621. The Att.orney General's decision not to appoint an Independent 
Counsel is "committed to his unreviewable discretion," even though the Act purports to require 
the Attorney General to appoint unless "he finds 'no reasonable grounds to believe that further 
investigation is warranted."' 487 U.S. at 696, 108 S.Ct. at 2622. 
Morrison also made clear that Congress could not remove or prevent the removal of the 
Independent Counsel, and the Special Division could not remove the Independent Counsel. 
In order to save the statute's constitutionality, the Court interpreted the statUJtory provision 
relating to termination to mean virtually nothing: "It is basically a device for removing from 
the public payroll an.independent counsel who has served her purpose, but is unwilling to 
acknowledge the fact. So construed, the Special Division's power to terminate does not pose 
a sufficient threat of judicial intrusion into matters that are more properly within the 
Executive's authority to require that the Act be invalidated as inconsistent with Article III." 
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 683, 108 S.Ct. at 2615. See. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Case Against 
Special Prosecuwrs, WALL STREET J OURNAL, Jan. 15, 1990, at p. AB. 
14 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). 
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1 absolute or temporary) from the commands of the criminal laws. If the framers of our 
2 Constitution wanted to create a special immunity for the President, they could have 
. 3 written the relevant clause. '.I'hey certainly knew how to write immunity clauses, for 
4 they wrote two immunity clauses that apply to Congress.15 But they wrote nothing 
5 to immunize the President. Instead, they wrote an Impeachment Clause treating the 
6 President and aill other civil officers the same way. Other civil officers, like judges, 
7 have been criminally prosecuted without being impeached. Sitting Vice Presidents 
8 have been indicted even though they were not impeached. 
9 
10 As Nixon v. Sirica 16 carefully noted: ''Because impeachment is available against 
11 all 'civil officers of the Untied Sates,' not merely against the President, it is difficult 
12 to understand how any immunities peculiar to the President can ·emanate by 
13 implication from the fact ofimpeachability." Moreover, it would be anomalous and 
14 aberrant to interpret the Impeachment Clause to immunize the President for alleged 
15 criminal acts, some of which occurred prior to the time he assumed the Presidency 
16 and all far removed from any of the President's enumerated duties: witness 
17 tampering, destruction of documents, subornation of perjury, perjury, illegal pay-offs. 
18 
19 BACKGROUND. 
20 
21 The. Office of Independent Counsel has investigated and continues to 
22 investigate various matters that are loosely grouped under the name of "Whitewater," 
23 which is a particular real estate deal that involves land developed in Arkansas. The 
24 "Whitewater" label is often used in the popular press. However, the investigative 
25 mandate to this Office of Independent Counsel is broade:r than this title implies. 
26 There are land deals other than Whitewater that are part of this investigation as well 
27 as other matters, such as the scandal involving the White House Travel Office and 
28 the misuse of FBI files by political operatives working in the White House. More 
29 recently, the Attorney General petitioned the Court to expand OIC's mandate and 
30 jurisdiction to include various allegations surrounding Ms. Monica Lewinsky and 
31 involving obstruction of justice, witness tampering, perjury, and suborning of 
32 perjury.17 
ui U.S. Const., art. I, § 6, cl. 1 [limited privilege from arrest; speech or debate 
privilege]. Both of these immunities are very limited in scope, as discussed below. 
16 487 F.2d at 700, 711 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)(per curiam) (internal 
citation omitted, citing the Impeachment Clause, Art. II, § 4) .. 
17 In that case, when the Ole came upon the initial information, the Ole referred . 
the matter to the Attorney General and suggested various alternatives: the Department of 
(continued ... ) 
NW: 16018 Docld: 70102162 Page 7 
. --.. -
8 
1 Attorney General Janet Reno and the Department of Justice have rejected the 
2 claims of those who seek to narrow the jurisdiction of this OIC.18 In addition, the 
3 Attorney General has, at various times, expanded the original jurisdiction of the OIC 
4 to include matters beyond those originally within the OIC mandate. 19 Indeed, the 
5 Attorney General has even gone to court in order to submit these matters to you and 
6 to expand the OIC's jurisdiction over your objection.20 While she has expanded the 
17 ( •• • continued) 
Justice could take over the investigation, or the DOJ could investigate together with the OIC, 
or the DOJ could turn over the entire matter to the OIC, or the DOJ could seek the 
appointment of a new Independent Counsel. The Att.orney General chose the third alternative 
and promptly asked the Special Division to expand the jurisdiction of the OIC. 
The Special Division granted this special request of the Attorney General. The OIC did 
investigate after it had received oral authorization t.o do so. This oral authorization was 
followed by written authorization. 
18 When others have claimed that the OIC is acting outside of its jurisdiction (a 
claim, for example, that Governor Jim Guy Tucker advanced in court), the Attorney General 
has also supported the OIC's jurisdiction and the Eight Circuit agreed with this position. 
19 The scandal and charges that have been collectively referred to as "Travel-gate" 
(involving the White House Travel Office) or the "FBI Files" (referring to FBI files sent to the 
White House and then used for partisan purposes) fit in this category. 
The Attorney General's efforts to expand your jurisdiction are also significant because 
recent events show that she is often reluctant to seek the appointment of a Independent 
Counsel. She has refused to appoint an Independent Counsel in various matters relating to 
campaign finance, even when the Director of the FBI has supported the appointment of an 
Independent Counsel. And, in matters involving other Independent Counsel, she has objected 
to any expansion of jurisdiction, even when the courts have eventually ruled that her position 
was legally in error. E.g., Terry Eastland, llow Justice Tried to Swp Smaltz, Wall Street 
Journal, Dec. 22, 1997, at A19, col. 3-6 (Midwest ed.). 
20 It is unusual for the subject of an investigation by an Independent Counsel to 
attack the bona {ides of the Independent Counsel. For example. neither Attorney General 
Meese nor his personal attorney ever personally attacked the people investigating him, even 
though the Independent Counsel was a member of the other political party. In fact, it has been 
typical for the Independent Counsel to be a member of the opposing political party. 
I am aware that some supporters of President Clinton (including his wife and 
occasionally the President himself) have engaged in public attacks on the OIC and personal 
attacks on the bona {ides of its attorneys. They accuse the OIC of partisanship and abuse of 
the prosecutorial powers. However, the fact that Attorney General Reno - who serves at the 
(continued ... ) 
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jurisdiction of the OIC, President Clinton has refuse<j/on several occasions to testify 
before the Grand Jury, had pled executive privilegeµ} block his aides from testifying, 
and has urged the creation of a new e of rivil · e to revent Secret Service ents 
from test" · / 
' 
I 
I 
Notwithstanding these roadblocks. the investigation is proceeding to the point 
that there is significant, credible, persuasive evidence that the President has been 
involved in various illegal activities in a conspiracy with others (in particular his 
wife), to tamper with witnesses, suborn perjury, commit perjury, hide or destroy 
incriminating documents, and obstruct justice. 
If the President were· any other official of the United States, for example, a 
Cabinet Officer or a Congressperson, I understand that the two Deputy Independent 
Counsel (one, a former U.S. Attorney and the other, a former member of the Public 
Integrity Section of the Department of Justice) have concluded that an indictment 
would be proper and would issue given the evidence before the Grand Jury. The 
Office of Independent Counsel is, in general, required to follow the Department of 
Justice regulations governing otlier federal prosecutors. To refuse to indict the 
President when the crimes are serious enough and the evidence strong enough that 
20 ( ••• continued) 
pleasure of President Clinton and is the highest law enforcement official in the Department 
of Justice - has gone to court to expand your jurisdiction (even over your objection) is 
inconsistent with these attacks. If she thought that the OIC or any of its attorneys were acting 
improperly in investigating President Clinton. she would make no sense for her to be fightirlg 
to expand the OIC's jurisdiction. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 
569 (1988), discussed below, made it quite clear that the Attorney General's decision not to 
seek the appointment of an Independent Counsel is Mt reviewable in any court. 
Recently, a bipartisan group of former Attorneys General of the United States have 
joined together to rebut the attacks on the integrity of the Independent Counsel. Their 
statement of March, 1998, was extraordinary. It said, in part: 
"As former attorneys general, we are concerned that the severity of the 
attacks on Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and his office by high-
leve[ government officials and attorneys representing their particular 
interests. among others, appear to have the improper purpose of 
influencing and impeding an ongoing criminal investigation and 
intimidating possible jurors, witnesses and even investigators." 
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a S 1enator or Cabinet Secretary would be indicted would be/inconsistent with the 
OIC's obligations to exercise its prosecutorial discretion the same way that the 
Department of Justice attorneys exercise their discretion to/refuse to indict. 
I 
I 
i 
Moreover, there is the apparent injustice that would: result if the Grand Jury 
would seek to indict the various members of this consp~~cy (e.g., Hillary Rodham 
Clinton) while refusing to indict the center of the consp~acy.21 
I 
I 
If the Grand Jury simply issues a report of the fact$ that it has found, but does 
not indict even though it concludes that there is su,bstantial evidence that the 
President has committed serious crimes, then the Presiaent has no judicial forum to 
present his side of the story and seek vindication in/the judicial system. As then 
Solicitor General Robert Bork said, in arguing that a sitting Vice President can be 
indicted: / 
21 I 
I 
I 
I 
"An officer may have co-conspir~tors and even if the officer 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' I 
' I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
' I 
I 
' I 
I 
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1 were immune [from indictment], his co-conspirators would not be. 
2 The result would be that the grand and petit juries would receive 
3 evidence about the illegal transactions and that evidence would 
4 , inevitably name the officer. The trial might end up in the 
5 conviction of the co-conspirators for their dealings with the 
6 officer, yet the officer would not be on trial, would not have the 
7 opportunity to cross-examine and present testimony on his own 
8 behalf. The man and his office would be slandered and 
9 demeaned without a trial in which he was heard. The individual 
10 might prefer that to the risk of punishment, but the courts should 
11 not adopt a rule that opens the office to such a damaging 
12 procedure."22 
13 
14 Consequently, you have asked my legal oprmon as to whether it is 
15 constitutional to indict a sitting President for actions that occurred both before he 
16 became President and while he was under investigation. 
17 
18 In order to answer the question, it is important to understand the 
19 constitutional issue in context. The question is not, as an abstract matter, whether 
20 any sitting President is immune from the criminal laws of the state or federal 
21· governments as long as he is in office. Rather, the question is whether - given the 
22 enactment of the Independent Counsel law under which the OIC operates, given the 
23 historical background that led to that law, and given the constitutionality of that law 
24 as determined by Morrison v. Olson23 - it is constitutional for a grand jury to indict 
25 this President if the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
26 President is part of an extensive and continuing conspiracy, stretching over many 
27 years, involving witness tampering, document destruction, perjury, subornation of 
28 perjury, obstruction of justice, and illegal pay-offs - all serious allegations that in 
29 no way relate to the President Clinton's official duties, even though some of the 
22 In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application 
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965, 
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional 
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 21 (emphasis added). Judge Bork concluded that a sitting Vice 
President could be indicted prior to impeachment but he also said (in dictum) that the 
President would be immune from indictment prior to impeachment. While Judge Bork argued 
that the President should be immune from indictment, his reasoning at this point supports the 
opposite conclusion. His point is well-taken: the Office of Independent Counsel should not cast 
a charge against the President without giving him a judicial forum within which to vindicate 
himself. 
23 487 U.S. 654, l08 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). 
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1 alleged violations occurred after he 'became President. 
2 
3 Before turning to this particular question, it is useful to consider some 
4 - background matters. 
5 
6 CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF CHIEF ExECUTIVES OF OTHER COUNTRIES. 
7 
8 First, it is interesting that democracies in other countries do not recognize a 
9 principle that an individual would be above the law and privileged to engage in 
10 criminal activities simply because he or she is the President, Premier, Prime 
11 Minister, Chief Executive, or Head of State. In fact, heads of state are not immune 
12 from criminal prosecution even if we only look at countries with a tradition of living 
13 under the rule of law that is much weaker than the tradition that exists in the United 
14 States. I have been unable to find any instances where a democracy - even a 
15 democracy that also recognizes a King or Queen - has immunized its Chief 
16 Executive Officer from criminal conduct simply because he or she is the Chief 
17 Executive Officer. 
18 
19 On the other hand, it is quite easy to find examples of foreign heads of state 
20 subject to prosecution for allegedly criminal activities. Even if one confines a search 
21- to the relatively short time period since -1980, it is not difficult to find various 
22 examples of heads of state who have been subject to the possibility of criminal 
23 prosecution (what we call "indictment" in this country) in a wide variety of 
24 countries.24 
25 
26 Other countries are governed by their own Constitutions, and the fact that 
27 their chief executives (like their other citizens) are subject to the criminal law does 
28 not, of course, mean that the chief executive officer of the United States is subject to 
29 its federal criminal laws. Each of these instances is, in a sense, unique and one can 
30 therefore distinguish them from the present circumstance. 
31 
32 Consequently, I do not rely on the examples discussed below in reaching the 
33 conclusions of the opinion letter. I simply present these examples as suggesting that 
34 the claim that the chief executive officer of the United States is immune from 
35 criminal prosecution and above the law as long as he holds the chief executive office 
36 is a claim that other countries (at least those who are not governed by a dictatorship) 
37 would find curious if not peculiar. 
38 
39 In VENEZUELA, in l 993, President Carlos Andres Perez was ordered to stand trial on 
24 In this case, I used a computerized search ofWESI'L.\ w for the period since 1980. 
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13 
embezzlement charges. Perez has · tl!e dubious distinction of being the first incumbent 
Venemelan president charged with a crime sinc.e the oountry shed a military dlictatorship and 
became a democracy in 195 8. The provisional government of Octavio Lepage was sworn 
in to replac.e Mr. Perez.25 
In PAKISTAN, in 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was charged with contempt of court 
after criticizing the judiciary, which is a crime in Pakistan. Sharif pleaded innocent. A 
conviction could lead to his removal from office. 26 The fact that he held the office of Prime 
Minister did not immunize him from the rule of law. 
In ITALY, prosecutors requested the indictment of Prime Minister Romano Prodi on charges 
of corrupt management of the oountry's state industries. The charges arose from the transfer 
of a food production company from state to private hands in 1993. Prodi was accused of 
fixing the sale of a large package of shares in the company by offering it to a politically 
well-connected private concern at a cut-price rate. The fact that he was Prime Minister did 
not immuniz.e him from the rule of law. A preliminary magistrate was in charge of deciding 
whether to order Prodi to stand trial.17 
In CANADA, Prime Minister Jean Chretien was charged with assault for manhandling a 
protester. His office of Prime Minister did not immunize him from the rule of law. Of 
course, the fact that he could be charged does not mean that he would be convicted, and, in 
fact, the charges were quashed. This was the first time this century that a sitting Canadian 
prime minister faced criminal assault charges. Kenneth Russell, brought the charge against 
the prime minister for grabbing a demonstrator by the throat during a Flag Day ceremony .18 
In FRANCE, traders said that "one of the major reasons for the enactment of emergency 
money market measures has been removed with Wednesday's decision not to pursue 
criminal charges against the Prime Minister for illegally acquiring cheap apartments for 
himself and his son." However, if the evidenc.e warranted, Prime Minister Alain Juppe 
would not be immunized from the rule of law and could have been prosecuted.19 
In ISRAEL, in 1995, Shekem workers asked Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair to open a 
26 Venezuela Ponders Next Move as President Ordered to Stand Trial, ATLANTA 
JOURNAL & CONST1TUTION, May 23, 1993, A 10, available in 1993 WESTLAw 3364034. 
26 Sharif Warns Cri.sis Taking Pakistan Near Destruction, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS 
SERV., Nov. 19, 1997. Raymond Bonner, Pakistan's Army May Settle Political Feud, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 199'7, at A4. 
27 Italian PM Faces Accusations, VANCOlNERSUN, Nov. 26. 1996, A7. available in 
1996 WestLaw 5031681; Andrew Gumbel, Prosecut.ors Turn Sights on Italian PM, THE INDEP. 
(London), Nov. 26, 1996, at 15, International Section. 
28 Gary Borg, Chretien is Charged Briefly with Assault, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1996, 
at AlO, available in 1996 WESTLAW 2669290. 
29 Capital Markets Report. Oct. 12, 1995; Reuters World Service, Oct. 11, 1995. 
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criminal investigation against Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin for allegedJJy violating sub 
judice laws. Rabin charged that "Shekem's fired workers are parasites." Israel's laws forbid 
publishing information on an issue negotiated in court if it could influence the court's 
ruling.30 Rabin's office of Prime Minister did not serve to· irnmwtize him from the rule of 
law. · 
In JAPAN, prosecutors ultimately refused to press charges against Prime Minister Noboru. 
Takeshita or any other major political leader being investigated for criminal activity int 
conpection with an influence-peddling scandal. Former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone 
and at least three cabinet members in Takeshita's government.also escaped !indictment. The 
scandal, however, forced Takeshita to announce on April 25, 1989, that he would resign.3L 
Once again, the Prime Minister was subject to the rule of law, and if the evidence had 
warranted could have been criminally pros•ecuted. 
In PAPUA NEWGUJNEA, a judge recommended that Prime Minister Bill Skate face criminal 
charges if evidence that he failed to stop a mutiny was confirmed.32 The fact that he was 
Prime Minister did not immunize him from the rule of law. 
In SLOVAKIA, in 1996, President Michael Kovac filed criminal slander .charges against 
Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.33 The fact that Meciar held the office of Prime Minister 
30 Galit Lipkis Beck, Shekem Workers: Investigate Rabin, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 
21, .1995, AB, availabk in 1995 WESTLAW 7552690; ·Galit Lipkis Beck, Shekem Workers Protest 
Rabin's Insults, J ERUSALEM POST, Feb. 24, 1995, at p. 15, in Economics Section. 
In another instance, ISRAEL, the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, faced a 
parliamentary no confidence vote after an inquiry found "insufficient evidence to link him t.o 
an alleged plot to subvert the investigation of a right-wing coalition ally on corruption charges 
by appointing a loyal but unqualified attorney general, Mr. Roni Bar On." Julian Borger, 
Confidence Vote Can Only Be Bad News for Netanyahu, IRISH TIMES, Jun. 24, 1997, AlO. 
availahl.e in 1997 WEST LA w 12011461; Anton La Guardia, Netanyahu Vows to Battle on After 
Escaping Charges, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 21, 1997, at 13, International Section. If the 
inquiry had found sufficient evidence, he would have been subject to indictment. His office of 
Prime Minister did not immunize him from the rule oflaw. 
31 Probe Ends, Japan's PM Not Charged in Scandal,, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 30, 
1989, B6, availabk in 1989 WESTLAw 5664899; Steven R. Weisman, Japanese Prosecutors End 
Scandal Inquiry Witlwut Indicting Major Figures, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1989, at A3. 
32 Papua New Guinea's PM Could Face Criminal Charges in Mutiny, Dow J ONES 
INT'L N EWS S ERV., Dec. 15, 1997. Around the World, S EATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15. 1997. 
33 Sl.ovakia President Fiks Charges Against Prime Minister, Dow J ONES INT'L NEWS . 
S ERV., May 30, 1996. 
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l did not serve to immunize him from the rule oflaw.J" 
2 
3 These examples should not be surprisin.g. As Chief Justice Marshall stated 
4 . nearly two centuries ago, in Marbury v. Madison,35 the case that has become the 
5 fountainhead of American constitutional law: ''The government of the United States 
6 has emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."36 And, he added, "In 
7 Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he 
8 never fails to comply with the judgment of his court."37 
9 
10 Let us now turn specifically to American law. The first item to consider is the 
11 language and structure of our Constitution. 
12 
13 THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
14 
15 Chief Justice Marshall explained that the Constitution "assigns to different 
3
' Cf. THAILAND, in 1992, where Prime Minister Suchinda Krapra.yoon resigned 
aft.er "acr.epting responsibility for the deaths of at least 40 people and the wounding of more 
than 600 when army troops opened fire on unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators." 
Demonstrat.ors demanded that trials be held for Suchinda and top military officers who were 
responsible for ordering troops to fire on unarmed demonstrators. A decree granted the Prime 
Minister amnesty from criminal charges arising from the repression of the protests. If there 
were no decree, the Prime Minister would be subject to the rule of law, and the fact that he 
was Prime Minister would not serve to immunize him. Even after the pardon, an effort was 
under way t.o have the amnesty decree declared illegal by a constitutional tribunal. Charles 
P. Wallace, Long-Awaited Constitutional Reforms Made in Thailand, COURIER-JOURNAL 
(Louisville, Ky.), May 26. 1992, A3, available in 1992 WESTLAw 7837659; William Branigin, 
Amnesty Oppositwn Building iri Thailand, HousroN CHRONICLE, May 25, 1992, A24. 
Also in THAILAND, in 1996, criminal fraud charges were leveled against Prime Minister 
Banharn Silpa-archa. His office of Prime Minister did not immunize him from the rule of law. 
The Bangkok Post said that "the charges involved allegations about the sale of land by Mr. 
Banharn's daughter, Ms. Kanchana, to the state and the diversion of a seven-billion-baht 
($393-million) fund from the environment to the Interior Ministry, which Mr. Banharn heads 
as minister." Banharn Faces Criminal Charges: Opposition, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Sept. 4, 
1996, available in 1996 WESTLAW 11723429; PM Faces Criminal Charges: Move to Slww 
Banharn's Zero Credibility, THE BANGKOK POST, June 3, 1997, at p. 1. 
35 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
36 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. 
37 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. Cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents 
as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footrwte, 1975 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 1 (1975), cited, e.g. in 
Clinton u. Jones, - U.S. -, -. 117 S.Ct. 1636, -, 137 L·.Ed.2d 945 (1997). 
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1 departments their respective powers."38 So that -
2 
3 "those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is 
4 written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is 
5 that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any time, be 
6 ·passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a 
7 government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those 
8 limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts 
9 prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation."39 
10 
11 . Because we live under a written constitution, and the Constitution was written 
12 so that we would be governed by the written words, it is useful to look at what that 
13 writing says about immunities from prosecution. Let us look at the language of the 
14 Constitution. 
15 
16 Our written Constitution has two specific sections that refer to what may be 
17 categorized as some type of "immunity" from the ordinary reach of the laws. 
18 
19 THE PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST. 
20 
21 First, Senators and Representatives are "privileged from Arrest during their 
22 Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning 
23 from the same ... ,"except in cases of "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace .... ''40 
24 
25 This section illustrates several important factors. First, the Framers of our 
26 Constitution thought about immunity, and when they did. they gave a limited immunity to 
27 the Senat.ors and Representatives. No similar clause applies to any member of the Executive 
28 Branch nor any member of the Judicial Branch. Second, the immunity·granted is really quite 
29 narrow. It only applies during a legislative session. Moreover, it is limited to arrest in civil 
30 cases, an obsolete form of arrest that no longer exists.41 
31 
32 The Privilege from Arrest Clause does rwt apply at all to criminal cases. It 
33 does not protect the Senator or Representative from service of process in a criminal 
311 
39 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77. 
U.S. CONST., ART. I,§ 6, cl. 1. 
41 See discussion in, 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J OHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 8.9, "Privilege from Arrest" 0Nest Pub. Co .. 2d ed. 1992). See also, . 
Williamson u. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 435-46, 28 S .Ct. 163, 166, 52 L.Ed. 278 (1908). 
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l case.42 It does not even protect the Senator or Representative from serVice of process 
2 in a civil case.43 In other words, this clause immunizes a Senator or Representative 
3 against a procedure that no longer exists - arrest in a civil case. 
4 
5 A13 Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Supreme Court, has warned us, this 
6 narrow privilege should be narrowly construed: 
7 
8 "Clause 1 [the privilege from arrest clause] defines the extent of the 
9 immunity. Its language is exact and leaves no room for a construction 
10 which would extend the privilege beyond the terms of the grant."44 
11 
12 THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE. 
13 
14 The same clause of the Constitution contains the only other reference to a 
15 privilege or immunity from the criminal law. It provides that, "for any Speech or 
16 Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."45 
17 
18 The Supreme Court has interpreted this "Speech or Debate" Clause, like the 
19 Privilege from Arrest Clause, quite narrowly. For example, if the Executive Branch 
20 seeks to prosecut.e a Member of Congress for taking a bribe to vote a certain way, the 
21 . prosecution cannot introduce into the trial the vote of the Representative, but the 
22 prosecution can introduce into evidence the "(p ]romises by a Member to perform an 
23 act in the future," because "a promise to introduce a bill is not a legislative act."46 In 
24 other words, Members of Congress can be criminally prosecuted for taking a bribe to 
25 introduce legislation into Congress, notwithstanding the supposed protections of the 
26 Speech or Debate Clause. 
27 
28 In addition, the Speech or Debate Privilege, like the Arrest Privilege, only 
29 applies to the Jegislative branch, not the executive branch. The Constitutional 
30 language makes that quite clear. The existence of these two privileges and the 
31 absence of any similarly clear language creating any sort of Presidential privilege is 
1800). 
42 United States v. Cooper, 25 Fed. Cases 626, (4 Dall.) 341, 1 L.Ed. 859 (C.C.Pa. 
Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 82, 55 S.Ct. 21, 22, 79 L.Ed. 208 (1934). 
Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 82, 55 S.Ct. 21, 22, 79 L.Ed. 208 (1934). 
U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
46 United States u. lfelstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489-90, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2439-40, 61 · 
L.Ed.2d 12 (1979)(emphasis in original). 
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1 significant. If the Framers of our Constitution had wanted to create some 
2 constitutional privilege to shield the President or any other member of the Executive 
3 Branch from criminal indictment (or to prevent certain officials from being indicted 
4 before they were impeached), they could have drafted such a privilege. They 
5 certainly know how to draft immunity language, for they drafted a very limited 
6 immunity for the federal legislature. 
7 
8 Yet, even in the case of federal legislators, the Constitution gives no immunity 
9 from indictment. As then Solicitor General Robert Bork concluded, in rejecting the 
10 argument that the United States could not indict a sitting Vice President: 
11 
12 "The Constitution provides no explicit immunity from 
13 criminal sanctions for any civil officer. The only express 
14 immunity in the entire document is found in Article I, Section 6, 
15 which provides, [here he quotes the "arrest clause"]. 
16 
17 "Since the Framers knew how to, and did, spell out an 
18 immunity, the natural inference is that no immunity exists where 
19 . none is mentioned. Indeed, any other reading would turn the 
20 constitutional te.xt on its head: the construction advanced by 
21 . counsel for the Vice President requires that the explicit grant of 
22 immunity t.o legislators be read as in fact a partial withdrawal of 
23 a oomplete immunity legislators would otherwise h ave possessed 
24 in common with other government officers. The intent of the 
25 Framers was to the contrary."·" 
26 
27 THE IMPEACHMENT CLAUSE. 
28 
29 The Language. There is only one impeachment clause in the Constitution. 
30 It does not purport to distinguish the impeachment of a federal judge from the Vice 
31 President, nor does it distinguish the impeachment of the Vice President from the 
32 President. The clause provides: 
33 
34 "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further 
35 than to removal from Office, and disqualification to. hold and 
36 enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United 
37 States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and 
47 In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application 
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965, 
Memorandum for t he United States Concerning the Vice Presiden t's Claim of Constitutional · 
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, a t p. 5. 
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I subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, 
2 according to Law ."48 
3 
4 This clause indicates that Congress should not be entrusted with the power to 
5 · impose any penalty on an impeached official other than (or no greater than) removal 
6 from office and disqualification from further office. Criminal penalties would be left 
7 to the judiciary. In addition, the clause makes clear that double jeopardy would not 
8 bar a criminal prosecution. The clause does not state that criminal prosecution must 
9 come after an impeachment, nor does it state that the refusal of the House to impeach 
I 0 (or the Senate to remove from office) would bar a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
11 
12 The Commentators and the Case Law. The available historical evidence 
13 as .to the meaning of this clause is sparse. One can find various historical references 
14 that assume that impeachment would precede indictment, but these references, as 
15 Professor John Hart Ely concluded, "did not argue that the Constitution required that 
16 order."49 Professor Ely, at the time, was a consultant to Archibald Cox, then the 
17 Watergate Special Prosecut.or, when he made these comments and concluded that the 
18 Constitution does not require that impeachment and removal precede a criminal 
19 indictment, even of the President. In 1996, in the midst of the Whitewater 
20 investigation, he reaffirmed his analysis. 60 
21. 
22 Judge Robert Bork agrees with Professor Ely, his former colleague at the Yale 
23 Law School. While Solicitor General, Judge Bork concluded., when "the Constitution 
24 provides that the 'Party convicted' is nonetheless subject to criminal punishment," 
25 that language does "not establish the sequence of the two processes, but [exists] solely 
26 to establish that conviction upon impeachment does not raise a double jeopardy 
27 defense in a criminal trial."61 
48 U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 7. Clause 6 provides that if the President is subject 
t.o impeachment, the Chief Justice of the United States shall preside. The framers evidently 
thought that the person who normally presides over the Senate [i.e. the Vice President of the 
Unit.ed States] should not preside in the case of a Presidential impeachment because he would 
be in a conflict of interest. 
49 J OHN HART ELY, ONCONSl'ITUTIONAL GROUND 138 (Princeton University Press 
1996) (emphasis added). 
60 J OHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 138-39 (Princeton University 
Press 1996). 
111 In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury lmpanel,ed December 5, 1972, Applicatwn . 
of Sp iro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73·965, 
) (continued ... ) 
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1 Of course, impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate is the only 
2 constitutional way to remove the President or Vice President or federal judges from 
3 office. A criminal conviction in an Article III federal court of a federal official does not 
4 remove this official from offic.e, even if the criminal act would also constitute "high 
5 crimes or misdemeanors." 
6 
7 The debates surrounding the drafting of the Constitution are "rife with 
8 assertions that the president is not a monarch above the law. and so the argument 
9 must proceed along the line that the president must be impeached before he can be 
10 criminally prosecuted."52 Let us consider some of these historical sources. 
11 
12 For example, in one of the FEDERALIST PAPERS, Alexander Hamilton says, "The 
13 punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not 
14 to terminate the chastisement of the offender ."53 Another FEDERALIST PAPER (also 
15 penned by Hamilton) stat.es the President can be impeached for "treason, bribery, or 
16 other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be 
17 liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law."54 Perhaps this 
18 language only means that if the President is being charged with actions that are 
19 peculiarly and uniquely contrary to Presidential responsibility (like treason 
20 committed while President, or acceptance of bribes while President), then 
21 impeachment must precede indictment. But that interpretation would mean that 
22 other crimes (assault and battery, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury, 
23 suborning perjury in a civil case, etc.) can be prosecuted prior to impeachment and 
24 removal from office. 
25 
26 Against this sparse language (which nowhere asserts that impeachment and 
61 ( ••• continued) 
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional 
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 10 (emphasis added). Solicitor General Bork, in this 
Memorandum ,by way of dictum, also concluded, based on the case law that existed at the 
time, that the President was immune from criminal prosecution prior to indictment. 
:12 JOHN HART ELY, ONCONITTITUTIONAL GROUND 138 (Princeton University Press 
1996). 
S!l THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 65, 8th paragraph (Alexander Hamilton). In No. 
69. 
.54 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 69, 4th paragraph (Alexander Hamilton) . 
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I removal must precede criminal indictment in all cases)55 is other specific historical. 
2 language that goes the other way and indicates that the Framers of our Constitution 
3 concluded that, unlike federal legislators, no special constitutional immunity should 
4 attach to the President.56 
5 
6 Consider, for example, the remarks of James Wilson, in the course of the 
7 Pennsylvania debates on the Constitution. He said: "far from being above the laws, 
8 he [the President] is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and in 
9 his public character by impeachment."67 That quotation implies that the President 
10 can be criminally prosecuted like any other citizen, without regard to impeachment. 
11 Similarly, Iredell, in the course of the North Carolina debates on the Constitution, 
12 said: ''Ifhe [the President] commits any misdemeanor in office, he is impeachable. 
13 ... If he commits any crime, he is punishable by the laws of his country, and in 
14 capital cases may be deprived of his life."68 
15 
16 Wilson was hardly a solitary voice. Charles Pinckney, a contemporary 
17 obs1erver, also stated: 
18 
19 "Let us inquire, why the Constitution should have been so 
20 attentive to each branch of Congress, so jealous of their [i.e., 
21 Congressional] privileges [Pinckney had just referred to the 
22 Congressional privilege from arrest, discussed above], and have 
23 shewn so little to the President of the United States in this 
24 respect .... No privilege of this kind was intended for your 
66 Professor John Hart Ely, who examined the historical references for Watergate 
Special Prosecut.or Archibald Cox, also concluded that the hist.orical references do not require 
that impeachment and removal precede a criminal indictment, even of the President. JOHN 
HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 139 (Princeton University Press 1996). 
156 See, e.g., MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
at p. 1066 (191 l)(comments of Charles Pinckney); 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 71 (1800)(Senator 
Pinckney, stating that "our Constitution supposes no man ... t.o be infallible, but considers 
them all as mere men, and subject to all the passions, and frailties, and. crimes, that men 
generally are, and accordingly provides for the trial of such as ought to be tried .... "); Eric M. 
Freedman, Achieving Political Adulthood, 2 NEXUS 67, 68 (Spring, 1997), also discussing 
account of Charles Pinckney, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. 
67 2 ELLIO'f'T'S DEBATES 480, quoted in WATERGATE SPECWJ PROSECUTION FORCE, 
Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara. at 7-8. 
158 4 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES 109, quoted in WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE . . 
Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara, at .S n .7. 
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I Executive, nor any except that which I have mentioned for your 
2 Legislature. The Convention which formed the Constitution well 
3 knew that this was an important point, and no subject had been 
4 more abused than privilege. They therefore determined so set the 
5 example, in merely limiting privilege to what was necessary, and 
6 no more."159 
7 
8 Tench Coxe, in his Essays on the Constitution, published in the Independent 
9 Gazetteer in September, 1787, agreed. He concluded, in discussing the President: 
10 
11 "His person is not so much protected a.s that of a member of 
12 the· House of Representatives.- for he· may be proceeded against like 
13 any other man in the ordinary course of law." (emphasis in 
14 original). 60 
15 
16 When those who argue that the President is immune from the criminal law 
17 until after he has been impeached look to the historical sources, the very most that 
18 they could draw from the historical debates in support of their view is that there 
19 certainly was no agreement to create any Presidential immunity from criminal 
20 indictment (either absolute or temporary), for the easiest way to create it (temporary 
21 or otherwise) would have been to add a clause to the Constitution defining its 
22 existence and extent. In fact. the contemporary sources suggest that the Constitution 
23 provides no criminal immunity for any President who commits crimes in his personal 
24 capacity. 
25 
26 This analysis should not be surprising; it is the same conclusion reached in 
27 Nixon v. SiTica,61 where the Court- after examining the Constitutional debates and 
28 the views of the Framers of our Constitution - said: 
59 10 ANNUALS OF CONGRESS 74 (1800). Also quoted in, 3 MAx FARRAND, THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 385, also cited in JOHN HART ELY, ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 415 (Princeton University Press 1996). 
60 Quoted in, 2 THE D OCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONS1'ITIITION 141 (1976), quoted with approval in Nimn v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, - (D.C. Cir. 
1973)(per curiam)(en bane). 
61 Nuon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(per curiam)(en bane). President 
Nixon chose not to appeal this ruling. 
Samuel Dash (also a special consultant to the Office of Independent Counsel) and I were 
two of the attorneys who filed a brief in this case on behalf of the Senate Watergate 
Committee. 
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1 "The Constitution makes no mention of special presidential 
2 immunities. Indeed, the Executive Branch generally is afforded 
3 none. This silence cannot be ascribed to oversight."62 
4 
5 · Later, this same Court said: 
6 
7 11Lacking textual support, counsel for the President nonetheless 
8 would have us infer immunity from the President's political 
9 mandate, or from his vulnerability to impeachment, or from his 
I 0 broad discretionary powers. These are invitations to refashion the 
11 Constitution and we reject them."63 
12 
13 Professor John Hart Ely - a distinguished Constitutional scholar, a former 
14 chaired Pl'ofessor of Constitutional Law as Harvard Law School, a former chaired 
15 Professor and the Dean of Stanford Law School, a special consultant to Watergate 
16 Prosecutor Archibald Cox, and now a chaired Professor at the University of Miami 
17 School of Law - concluded, after analyzing the debates at the Constitutional 
18 Convention, that it would be "misleading" to argue that there was a special 
19 Presidential immunity from criminal indictment or prosecution until the President 
20 was first impeached. He concluded that "there was no immunity contemplated by the 
21 , framers-. or if they contemplated it they didn't say so .... " As Professor Ely went 
22 on to explain: 
23 
62 Nixon u. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(per curiam)(en bane): 
"Thus, to find the President immune from judicial process, we 
must read out of [United States u.] Burr, [25 Fed. Cases p. 30 (Case No. 
14,6962d) (1807)] and Youngstown [Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952)], the underlying principles that the eminent 
jurists in each case thought they were establishing. The Constitution 
makes no mention of special presidential immunities. Indeed, the 
Executive Branch generally is afforded none. This silence cannot be 
ascribed to oversight. James Madison raised the question of Executive 
privilege during the Constitutional Convention, and Senators and 
Representatives enjoy an express, if limited, immunity from arrest, and 
an express privilege from inquiry concerning 'Speech and Debate' on the 
floors of Congress .  " 
[footnotes omitted; emphasis added.] 
63 487 F.2d at 711 [emphasis added). 
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1 "To the extent that they [the Constitutional debates] suggest 
2 anything on the subject, the debates suggest that the immunities 
3 the Constitution explicitly granted members of Congress (which 
4 do not, incidentally, include this sort of immunity [from criminal 
5 prosecution]) were not intended for anyone else. The argument 
6 for presidential immunity from indictment is one that must be 
7 based on necessity - and perhaps, but only perhaps, the 
8 presidency and vice presidency are distinguished on that score -
9 but not on· anything the framers said either in the Constitution 
IO itself or during the debates."64 
11 
12 Consider also some remarks that Joseph Story made in his COMMENTARIES ON 
13 THE CONSTITUTION: 
14 
15 "There are other incidental powers, belonging to the 
16 executive department, which are necessarily implied from the 
17 nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among these 
18 must necessarily be included the power to perform them, without 
19 any obstruction or impediment whatsoever. The president 
20 cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, 
21 while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this 
22 purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to 
23 possess an official inviolability. In the exercise of his political 
24 powers he is to use his own discretion .. .. But he has no 
25 authority to control other officers of the government, in relation 
26 to the duties imposed on them by law, in cases not touching his 
27 political powers."65 
28 
29 Some people focus on the phrase: ''The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest., 
30 imprisonment, or detention .... " However, they forget to read the rest of the 
31 sentence, which gives him this immunity only when pursuing his official duties.: 
32 "while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office .... " Obstruction of justice, 
33 witness tampering, destruction of documents, accepting pay-offs - none of this is 
34 part of the President's official duties. In fact, as Justice Story states, the President: 
35 "has no authority to control other officers of the government, in relation to the duties 
64 JOHiN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 141 (Princeton University Press 
1996) (emphasis added). 
615 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TI-IE CONSTITIITION, § 814, at p. 579 (RONALD 
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds., Carolina Academic Press, 1987, originally published, 
1833); J OSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION,§ 1563, at 418-19 (1833 ed.). 
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1 imposed on them by law, in cases not touching his political powers." 
2 
3 Justice Story explained that these "other officers of the government" - judges, 
4 federal prosecutors, the Independent Counsel - are supposed to do their jobs, to 
5 perform the duties imposed on them by law. The duties imposed on the Independent. 
6 Counsel are duties imposed by the IndepenQ.ent Com1.sel statute and by the decision 
7 of Attorney General Janet Reno to petition the court to appoint an Independent 
8 Counsel. The statute provides that Independent Counsel must, in general, comply 
9 with the regulations of the Department of Justice.66 If President Clinton's alleged 
10 criminal acts would be criminally prosecuted by the Department of Justice if a 
11 Cabinet Officer or Senator or Representative committed those crimes, and if the 
12 alleged crimes are serious enough and the evidence of criminality is substantial so 
13 that a federal prosecutor believes that he or she would secure a conviction beyond a 
14 reasonable doubt by a fair-minded jury, then the Independent Counsel; following his 
15 statutory duty, should allow the Grand Jury to indict. 
16 
17 The prosecution in this case does to refate to any political dispute between 
18 Congress and the President. It does not relate to claims that the President should, 
19 or should not have, exercised political discretion in a particular way. There is no 
20 issue as to whether the President should have deployed a new Air Force bomber, or 
21. whether the President should not have sent troops to Bosnia. The issues in this case 
22 do not relate to the President's official duties. In fact, some of the issues occurred 
23 before he became President, and all of the issues (obstruction, conspiracy, witness 
24 tampering, etc.) have nothing to do with the President's official duties to take care 
25 that the law be faithfully executed.67 · 
26 
27 The language that I have quoted from Justice Story is often quoted in the 
28 relevant case law. The courts have placed the same interpretation on that language 
29 that I have. In Nixon u. Fitzgerald,68 for example, the Court quoted this language 
30 from Justice St.ory69 and held that the President had no immunity from civil damages 
31 for matters that were out.side the outer perimeter of his official duties. In fact, in that 
66 CITE 
67 The facts here are not like the situation in Morrison v. Olson, where a criminal 
prosecution of a high-level political appointee of the President arouse out of "a bitter power 
disput.e between the President and the Legislative· Branch . ... " 487 U.S. 654, 703, 1087 S.Ct. 
2597, 2625, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
68 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). 
69 457 U.S. at 749, 102 S.Ct. at 2701. 
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case, Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Black.mun said explicitly that "there 
is no contention that the President is immune from criminal prosecution in the courts 
under the criminal laws ... (n]or would such a claim be credible .... Similarly, our 
cases indicate that immunity from civil damage actions carries no protection from 
criminal prosecution."70 By the way, Vice President Gore, while a U.S. 
Representative, agreed with the dissent in this case ~d argued that the President 
should not even be immune from civil damage suits for acts does in his official 
capacity.71 
IO The majority opinion in Fitzgerald did not dispute this conclusion that the 
11 President is subject to criminal indictment. On the contrary, the majority appeared 
.12 to agree with the dissent on this point. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist, 
13 Stevens, O'Connor & Chief Justice Burger, responded that absolute immunity from 
14 civil damages '"does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish 
15 that which occurs."'72 This is so because the judge or prosecutor - who, like the 
16 President is absolutely immune from a civil damage lawsuit brought by a private 
. 17 litigant in certain cases - can still be criminally prosecuted.73 
18 
19 Clinton v. Jones74 also quotes this same passage from Justice Story. Justice 
20 Stevens, for the Court, italicizes part of this quotation. The President -
21 
22 "cannot, therefore be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, 
23 while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this 
24 purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to 
25 possess an official inviolability." (emphasis in original).76 
26 
27 The Court went on to say: "Story said only that 'an official inviolability,' 
70 457 U.S. at 780, 102 S.Ct. at 2717 (dissenting opinion). 
71 See discussion in, Ronald D. Rotunda, Paula Jones Day in Court, 17 LEGAL 
TIMES (OF WASHINGTON, D.C.) 24, 27 (May 30, 1994), reprinted, e.g., 10 TEXAS LA WYER 24, 27 
(June 13, 1994), referring to Amicus Brief that Representative Gore joined. 
72 457 U.S. at 757 n.38, 102 S.Ct. at 2705 n. 38, quoting Imbler u. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. a t 428-29, 96 S.Ct. at 994. 
73 457 U.S. at 757 n.38, 102 S.Ct. at 2705 n. 38, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. at 428-29, 96 S.Ct. at 994. 
'" - U.S. - , 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). 
7r. - U.S. at - n . 23; 117 S .Ct. at 1645 n. 23 (emphasis in original). 
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1 [emphasis by the, Court] was necessary to preserve the President's ability to perform 
2 the functions of his office; he did not specify the dimensions of the necessary 
3 immunity."76 Once again the Court made clear that there is no need to give the 
4 President absolute immunity from crimin,al prosecution when he is charged with 
5 offenses that do not relate to the discharge of the duties of his office because criminal 
6 activities are not in the discharge of the President's offi,dal duties. 
7 
8 As the Court explicitly stated: "With respect to acts taken in his 'public 
9 character' - that is official acts - the President may be disciplined principally by 
IO i.mpeachm'.ent, not by private lawsuits for damages. But he is otherwise subject to the 
l 1 laws for his purely private acts."77 For private acts, acts taken in his private capacity, 
12 the ·President is "otherwise subject to the laws." That has to mean "all" of the laws, 
13 including the criminal laws. If a President suborns perjury, tampers with witnesses, 
14 destroys documents, he is not acting in his official capacity as President. The fact 
15 that some of these acts occurred prior to the time he became President does not 
16 bolster his claim of immunity from the criminal laws. 
17 
18 If the President is indicted for acts that occurred prior to the time he became 
19 President and for acts that were not taken as part of his official constitutfonal duties, 
20 then, as Clinwn v. Jone.s states: "the fact that a federal court's exercise of its tradition 
21 Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief 
22 Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution."78 The Court 
:p added: 
24 
25 "it must follow that the federal courts have power to determine 
26 the legality of his [the President's] unofficial conduct."79 
27 
28 If a President were indicted for acts not taken in his official capacity as 
29 President, a federal court would only be exercising its traditional Article III 
30 jurisdiction. Article III courts have the power to determine the legality of the 
31 President's unofficial conduct, even though the exercise of that traditional jurisdiction 
32 may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive. 
33 
34 If public policy and the Constitution allow a private litigant to sue a sitting 
76 Id. 
77 
- U.S. at-, 117 S .Ct. 1645 (emphasis added). 
78 
- U.S . at -, 117 S .Ct. at 1648-49. 
79 
- U.S. at - , 117 S.Ct. at 1650. 
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1 President for alleged acts that are not part of the President's official duties (and are 
2 outside the outer perimeter of those duties) - and that is what Clinton u. Jones 
3 squarely held- then one would think that an indictment is constitutional because 
4 the public interest in criminal cases is greater than the public interest in civil cases. 80 
5 
6 IMPLIED PRIVILEGE? 
7 
8 Although the Constitution, by its own terms, does not create a privilege, that 
9 does not end the discussion, because the Supreme Court may create a common law 
IO privilege or derive such a privilege from its earlier precedent. Let us now consider 
11 this issue. 
12 
13 EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE. First, one should look at the role that Executive 
14 Privilege has played in the case law. The President, over the course of two centuries, 
15 has sometimes raised a claim of Executive Privilege when Congress demands certain 
16 information. But that was not the fact pattern involved in United States v. Nixon.n 
80 Nixon v. Fit,zgerald, the Supreme Court held that the President was absolutely 
immune for civil damages involving actions taken within his official duties, but also 
emphasized that this was "merely a private suit for damages" and that there is "a lesser public 
int.crest in actions for civil damages than, for exampl,e, in criminal prosecutions." 457 U.S. 731, 
754 & n.37, 102 S..Ct. 2690, 2703 & n.37. 
81 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41L.Ed.2d1039 (1974). ' 
For a discussion of prior incidences where Presidents provided personal testimony, 
under oath, pursuant to subpoena, see, Ronald D. Rotunda, Presidents and Ex-Presidents as 
Witnesses: A Bri.ef Historical Footrwte, 1975 U. OF ILLINOIS LAW FORUM 1 (1975). 
The earlier cases - where the President complied with a subpoena in a criminal case 
dlid not reach the U.S. Supreme Court. See also, 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE§ 7·1(a)·(d) (West Pub. Co .• 
2d ed. 1992)(and corresponding pages in 1998 pocket part). 
However, the Supreme Court, prior to United States v. Nixon, did explicitly approve of 
United States v. Burr, 25 Federal Cases 30, 34 (No. 14,6962d)(C.C.Va. 1807), the decision that 
required President Jefferson to comply with a subpoena issued by an Article III court. After 
stating that "the public has a right to every man's evidence" the Court, in Branzberg v. Hayes, 
408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (1972), added this footnote: 
"Tn United States v. Burr Chief Justice Marshall, sitting on Circuit, opined that 
in proper circumstances a subpoena could be issued to the President of the 
United States." 
(continued ... ) 
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1 Instead, the question was quite different: whether the President could refuse to 
2 disclose information relevant to a federal criminal prosecution brought in an Article 
3 III court. President Nixon was the first President in history to litigate the use of 
4 Executive Privilege in the court system and the U.S. Supreme Court and to refuse to 
5 tum over evidence based on this theory. President Clinton is only the second 
6 President in history to raise and.litigate Executive Privilege in an effort to block 
7 evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. 82 
8 
9 The main case on this question, United States v. Nixon, recognized a very 
IO limited form of an evidentiary privilege in the case where the President pleads 
11 Executive.Privilege to a subpoena issued under the authority of an Article III court. 
12 in connection with a criminal case.83 
13 
14 While the Supreme Court recognized Executive Privilege in United States v. 
15 Ni,ron it did not apply it to shield the President; it did not allow President Nixon to . 
16 assert it in order to prevent disclosure of Presidential tapes regarding confidential 
17 conversations. As Judge Robert Bork recently explained: "Nixon's claim, being based 
18 only on a generalized interest in confidentiality was overcome by the need of the 
81 ( ... continued) 
Branzberg u. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 688 n.26, 92 S.Ct. at 2660 n.26. 
8~ Thus far, President Clinton has lost on this issue. He raised, and then 
abandoned, the Executive Privilege claim in his wisuccessful effort to prevent the Independent 
Counsel from subpoenaing not.es taken by Government lawyers (various Whit.e House counsel) 
of conversations with Hillary Clinton. See discussion in, Ronald D. Rotunda, Lips Unlocked: 
Attorney Cl~nt Privi/.ege and Government Lawyers, LEGAL TIMES (OF WASHINGTON, D.C.) 21-
22, 28 (June 30, 1997). 
President Clinton also unsuccessfully raised Executive Privilege in an effort to prevent 
Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal from testifying before the Grand Jury. In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, Misc: Action 98-095, 98-096 & 98-097 (NHJ), filed under seal, May 4, 1998 
(D.D.C.Cir.) (Judge Norma Holloway Johnson). 
83 418 U.S. at 712, n.19, 94 S.Ct. at 3109 n.19: 
"We are not here concerned with the balance between the 
President's generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for 
relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the 
confidentiality interest and the congressional demands for information, 
nor with the President's interest in preserving state secrets. We address 
only the conflict between the President's assertion of a generalized 
privilege of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant 
evidence in criminal trials." 
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I courts and parties in a criminal case for relevant evidence."84 The Court, in short. 
2 recognized Executive Privilege and then ordered the President to turn over the 
3 evidence. The Court rejected any claim of a general Executive Privilege in criminal 
4 proceedings. 'If the matter involved military secrets - where the missile silos are 
5 buried in Montana - or diplomatic secrets - the contents of a secret cable from the 
6 Ambassador to China - the courts are likely to recognize a privilege in the 
7 appropriate case. But the issues that surrounded President Nixon, and the issues 
8 now surrounding President Clinton, do not fall in these categories. 
9 
10 In addition, the Supreme Court, in its reasoning in United States v. Nixon, 
11 relied on the "necessary and proper'' clause of Article I. 85 That clause gives Congress 
12 the power to expand on other powers - to "make all Laws which shall be necessary 
13 and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers."86 This power is 
14 granted to Congress, not to the President. United States v. Nixon suggests that 
15 Congress may well have the power, under the necessary and proper clause, to create, 
16 explicitly, some sort of immunity from criminal prosecution for the President - · 
17 assuming that this immunity (whether temporary or absolute) is not so broad that it 
18 violates other provisions of the Constitution.87 But Congress has not done so. It has 
19 enacted no statute giving any sort of immunity from the criminal laws to the 
20 President. 
21 
84 Robert H. Bork, Indict Clinwn?- How I Wish It Were Possibk, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, March 18, 1998, at A22, col. 3 (Midwest ed.). 
86 418 U.S. at 706 n.16, 94 S.Ct. at 3106 n.16, citing McCuUoch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). 
86 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
87 Congress could, if it wished, provide for what is known as "protective 
jurisdiction" so that criminal actions that stat.es bring against federal officials must be tried 
in federal court rather than state court. 
However. it is an open question whether it would be constitutional for Congress to enact 
a statute that, either explicitly or in effect, immunizes the President from the application of 
federal criminal laws. All of the acts of Congress must comply with the limitations of the Bill 
of Rights. For example, could Congress provide that the President is immune from criminal 
law if he kills someone, or takes that person's property by theft or deception, or imprisons that 
person? The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be 
"deprived of life , liberty, or property, without due process of law." If the President (like an 
absolute Monarch) has immunity from the criminal law, will we really be a nation of laws and 
not of men? Did our predecessors revolt from one king only to install another? 
NW: 16018 Docld: 70102162 Page 30 
31 
I RELEVANT FEDERAL STATUTE REJECTS CRIMINAL IMMUNITY. No federal 
2 statutes recognize, or purport to recognize, any Presidential immunity from criminal 
3 indictment. Indeed, Congress has done quite the opposite: it has created an 
4 Independent Counsel stature for the express purpose of investigating alleged criminal 
5 activities of the President. In fact, it enacted this statute with a specific background 
6 of criminal allegations surrounding thi,s particular President. And this particular 
7 President not only signed the law, he and his Attorney General lobbied for the law 
8 so that the Special Division of the District of Columbia Circuit could appoint an 
9 Independent Counsel to investigate alleged criminal activities of this President.88 
10 Attorney General Janet Reno testified that "President Clinton and the Department 
11 of Justice strongly supported reauthorization" of the Independent Counsel Act.89 
12 
13 The legisfative history of the Independent Counsel law nowhere states that the 
14 President cannot be indicted, or is above the law or is immune from the criminal law 
15 as long as he is a sitting President. The official Legislative History of the Ethics in 
16 Government Act of 1978, creating the first independent law, does not suggest that the 
17 President is immune from indictment. In fact, it takes pains to reject any such 
18 suggestion. The relevant legislative history provides the following: 
19 
20 "Subsection (c) simply gives the special prosecutor, who has 
21 information which he wants to turn over to the House of 
22 Representatives because it involves potentially impeachable offenses 
23 against the individuals names in this subsection, the authority to so 
24 tum over that information. 
25 
26 "Thi,s sectwn should in no way be interpreted as identifying 
27 individuals who are not subject to criminal prosecution prwr to being 
28 impeached and removed from office. In fact, a number of persons 
29 holding the positions identified in this subsection have been subject to 
30 criminal prosecution while still holding such an offi.ce."90 
31 
32 THE BORK MEMORANDUM. The distinguished constitutional scholar and then 
88 See generally, Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-
270. 4 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS 809-1 (1994). 
89 4 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, at 753 
(1994)(emphasis added). 
· 
90 Legislative History of Ethics in Government Act of 1978, P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 
at Large 1824, U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE NEWS 41216, 4287-88 (emphasis 
added) .. 
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1 Solicitor General, Robert Bork, concluded in a Memorandum he filed in the criminal 
2 prosecution of Vice President Agnew, that the Vice President could be indicted and 
3 tried prior to impeachment but the President, in contrast, would be immune from 
4 criminal prosecution prior to impeachment. Judge Bork relied on several arguments. 
5 One of the most significant was that-
6 
7 "The Framers could not have contemplated prosecution of an 
8 incumbent President because they vested him complete power 
9 over the execution of the laws, which includes, of course, the 
10 power to control prosecutions."91 · 
11 
12 If President Clinton had the complete "power to control prosecutions" today, 
13 Judge Bork's analysis would be applicable. But President Clinton made sure that he 
14 does not have the "complete power" to "control prosecution." President Clinton and 
15 Attorney General Reno lobbied for the Independent Counsel Act, and President 
16 Clinton signed it.92 This law places important limitations on the Attorney General's 
17 power to remove the Independent Counsel. The Independent Counsel can, in brief, 
18 only he removed for cause. President Clinton signed the law and decided to give up 
19 his "complete power" to "control prosecution." Under the statute, the Independent 
20 Counsel can only be removed "for cause." The Supreme Court upheld the 
21 constitutionality of limiting the removal power in Morrison v. Olson.93 
22 
23 Judge Bork's reasoning implies that the President is subject to indictment if 
91 In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury I mpane/,ed December 5, 1972, Applicatwn 
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965, 
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional 
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 20. 
92 The fact that the President has signed this law is relevant in determining 
whether this law - and its implicit authorization of a grand jury to investigate alleged 
criminal acts by President Clinton "disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate 
branches" and "prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing itts constitutionally assigned 
functions." Nixon v. Admini,strawro{General Services, 433 U.S. 425, - , 97 S.Ct. 2777, -. 53 
L.Ed.2d 867 (1977), quoting United States u. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 
1039 (1974). In deciding that the law was constitutional. Nixon u. Admini,strator emphasized: 
"The Executive Branch became a party to the Act's regulation when President Ford signed the 
Act into law .... " In that case,· the Act was applied against a former President. In this case, 
the Executive Branch became a party to the Independent Counsel Act when the present 
President - President Clinton - signed a law that was written to create an Independent 
Counsel to investigate that same President - President Clinton. 
113 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). 
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1 he gives up the power to control prosecutions. And that is exactly what President 
2 Clinton did. 
3 ' 
4 Judge Bo:rk, in his Memorandum concluding that the Vice President - but not 
5 the President - can be indicted prior to impeachment, also relied on the TWENTY-
6 FIFTH AMENDMENT in support of his conclusion.94 Judge Bork argued that "the 
7 President is the only officer from whose temporary disability the Constitution 
8 provides procedures to qualify a replacement .. " From that he concludes: "This is 
9 recognition that the President is the only officer whose temporary disability while in 
IO ·office incapacitates an entire branch of government." 
11 
12 _However, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment suggests the opposite conclusion, 
13 especially after the decision in Jones u. Clinton. Because· of this Amendment, the 
14 temporary disability of the President does not incapacitate an entire branch of 
15 government because the Constitution itself rec.ognizes the pr9blems and deals with 
16 it in a structural way, not by creating an immunity but by providing for a temporary 
17 replacement. In addition, the indictment of the President does-not incapacitate either 
18 the President or entire Executive Branch. Aaron Burr was quite able to function as 
19 a Vice President although indicted. Indictment does not incapacitate the indicted 
20 individual. 
21 
22 In the unlikely event that the defense of a civil case (e.g., Jones v. Clinton) or 
23 the defense of a criminal case would prevent the President from performing his 
24 duties, the Executive Branch does not simply shut down. The Twenty Fifth 
25 Amendment, § 3, provides a procedure for the Executive Branch to continue to 
26 function "[w]henever the President transmits . .. his written declaration that is 
27 unable t.o discharge the powel'S and duties of his office .... " This procedure is clearly 
28 not limited to cases of illness. 
29 
30 One should also note that it is easy to make a claim that the Executive Branch 
31 will simply "shut down," .but that claim is difficult to accept. President Clinton, 
32 during the pendency of the Jones case, said repeatedly that the looming civil case was 
33 not affecting his duties as President. Nonetheless, while he was making those 
34 statements, the defense attorneys claimed that a delay was necessary because of the 
35 burdens on the President. The trial judge in Jones v. Clinton refused to change the 
36 date of the civil trial. When attorneys cry "wolf' too often, they lose their credibility. 
37 (Subsequently, the trial judge granted summary judgment to the defendant.) 
94 In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application 
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Ca se Number Civil 73-965, 
Memorandum for t he United States Concerning t he Vice Presiden t's Claim of Constitutional 
Immu nity, Oct. 5, 1973, a t p. 18. · 
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- 1 TEMPORARY IMMUNITY CREATED BY STATUTE. Perhaps Congress could enact 
2 a stature creating some sort of temporary immunity, - that is, providing that there 
3 shall be no trial of a sitting President until after he has finished his term of office as 
4 President. However, enactment of such a law would raise important constitutional 
5 and policy issues. 
6 
7 First, in terms of the Constitution, the Sixth Amendment grants the accused 
8 a right to a "speedy and public trial." If Congress were to enact a statute that 
9 immunizes a sitting President from any criminal indictment as long as he holds 
10 office, then the delay in the indictment (and resulting delay in any trial) will run 
11 afoul of the speedy trial guarantee. Presumably the President could waive this right, 
12 in ~y particular case. However, if the President could waive this right, then he 
13 should be able to waive his other rights. If one of his rights is the right to temporary. 
14 immunity, then he should be able to waive that right as well. 
15 
16 And, if the President has a right to temporary immunity, he appears that he 
17 may have waived this right by signing the Independent Counsel Act - which was 
18 enacted only after this President and his Attorney General advocated its passage. 
19 Janet Reno stated that President Clint.on ''strongly supported reauthorization" of this 
20 Independent Counsel Act.95 President Clinton lobbied for, and signed,98 the present 
21 Independent Counsel Act, with full knowledge that the Act's first court-appointed 
22 counsel would be specifically charged with investigating criminal allegations against 
23 President Clinton. 
24 
25. As President Clint.on stated when he signed the law: 
26 
27 "[This law] ensures that no matter what party controls · the 
28 Congress or the executive branch, an independent, nonpartisan 
29 process will be in place to guarantee the integrity of public 
30 officials and ensure that no one is above the law."91 
95 4 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS, at 753 
(1994)(emphasis added). 
96 In Ni.xon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 
L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) the Court found it significant - in deciding the case involving the 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act against former President Nixon -
that the "Executive Branch became a party t;o the Act's regulation when President Ford signed 
the Act into law .. .. " 433 U.S. at 426, 97 S.Ct. at 2781. In t his case, President Clinton 
himself, not a subsequent President, signed the Act into law. 
97 Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S.24, June 30, 1994, 
(continued ... ) 
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President Clinton was correct. As Lloyd Cutler, the former Counsel to President 
Clinton, said in supporting the concept of an Independent Counsel, President Nixon 
was "certainly not a fluke. The qualities that betrayed him and us are far from 
unique, and we will see them in future administrations again."98 
Second, in terms of policy, if Congress were to enact temporal immunity from 
criminal liability for the President, it would first have to consider the costs. The old 
proverb, "justice delayed is justice denied;" applies with special vigor in the context 
of a criminal prosecution. The statute of limitations may prevent prosecution. As 
veteran prosecutors know, if a trial is delayed, then the memories of witnesses will 
fade, documents may be destroyed. It is an axiom that delaying a criminal trial-
especially delaying for years - may result in, or be tantamount to creating, a de facto 
immunity. 
In any event, even if Congress could enact a statute immunizing the President 
from the federal criminal laws, it has not done so. Instead, it has enacted a statute 
that authorized an Independent Counsel to use the federal grand jury system to 
investigate alleged criminal activities of this President. 
LEGAL PRECEDENT 
THE CASE LAW AND LEGAL OPINIONS. N 0 legal precedent has ever concluded 
that the President is immune from the federal criminal laws. In fact, the cases have 
suggested the contrary. 
For example, in 1972, Gravel v. Uni'ted States99 noted: ''The so-called executive 
privilege has never been applied to shield executive officials from prosecution for 
. " en.me .... 
30 In 1982, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 100 the Supreme Court held that the President 
31 was absolu'tely immune for civil damages involving actions taken within his official 
32 duties, but also emphasized that this was "merely a private suit for damages" and 
91 ( ••• continued) 
in, 30 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1383, July 4, 1994. 
98 Lloyd Cutler, A Permanent "Special Prosecuwr," WASHINGTON Posr, Dec. 2, 
1974, at A24, col. 4. 
99 408 U.S. 606, 627, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2628, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). 
100 457 U.S. 731. 102 S.Ct. 2690. 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). 
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1 that there is "a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, 
2 in criminal prosecutions."101 This Court also made clear that there would be no 
3 immunity from civil damage claims, for actions that were not "within the outer 
4 perimeter of his [the President's] authority."102 There is only "absolute Presidential 
5 immunity from damages liability for acts within the 'outer perimeter' of his official. 
6 responsibility ."103 
7 
8 In 1994, Lloyd Cutler, the White House Counsel to President Clinton, issued 
9 his official legal opinion that it was against the Clinton Administration policy to 
1 O invoke Executive Privilege for cases involving "personal wrongdoing'' by any 
11 government official. 104 
12 
13 Later, in Clinton v. Jones,1°5 the Court rejected any notion of Presidential 
14 immunity (even a temporary immunity) for the President who is sued by a private 
15 civil litigant for damages involving acts not within his Presidential duties. In that 
16 case, President Clinton's "strongest argument" supporting his claim for immunity on 
17 a temporary basis, the Court said, was the claim that the President occupies a 
18 "unique office" and burdening him with litigation would violate the constitutional 
19 separation of powers and unduly interfere with the President's performance of his 
20 official duties.106 
21 
22 In language of remarkable breadth, the Jones Court repeatedly stated that rw 
23 amount of this kind of burden would violate the Constitution. The President, the 
24 Court held: "errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and the 
25 Executive, even quite burdensome interactio,ns, necessarily rise to the level of 
26 constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive's ability to perform its 
27 constitutionally mandated functions."107 The opinion, which had no dissents, quoted 
28 with approval James Madison's view that separation of powers "does not mean that 
101 
102 
103 
457 U.S. 731, 754 & n.37, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2703 & n.37 (emphasils added). 
457 U.S. at 757, 102 S.Ct. at 2705. 
457 U.S. at 756. 102 S.Ct. at 2704. 
10
" Lloyd Cutler Legal Opinion of Sept. 28, 1994, discussed in, T.R.Goldman, Cutl,er 
Opined Against Broad Use of Privilege, LEGAL TIMES (OF WASHINGTON, D.C.) 14 (Feb. 9, 1998). 
105 
- U.S. - , 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). 
106 
- U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1645-46. 
107 
- U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1648. 
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. I the branches 'ought to have no partwl agency in, or no controul over the acts of each 
2 other."'108 
3 
4 And, if that were not clear enough, Justice· Stevens' opinion added this 
5 clincher: 
6 'The fact that a federal court~ exercise of its traditional Article III 
7 jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of 
8 the Chref Executive is not sufficrent to establish a violation of the 
9 Constitution. •Jlo9 
10 
11 The Court explained that it ''has the authority to determine whether he has acted 
12 within the law."110 And, "it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial 
13 process in appropriate circumstances."111 
14 
15 In the Watergate Tapes case (United States v. Nixon112], President Nixon 
16 argued that a President could Ii.ot be subject to the criminal process because, "if the 
17 President were indictable while in office, any prosecutor and grand jury would have 
18 within their power the ability to cripple an entire branch of the national government 
19 and hence the whole system."113 The Court did not reach that question, but Clinton 
108 
- U.S. at - , 117 S.Ct. at 1648 (emphasis in original), quoting THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS, Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-36 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), which also has emphasis in the 
original. 
109 
- U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1648-49 (emphasis added). I ten.tatively explored the 
implications of the strong language of the Jones case is, Ronald D. Rotunda, The True 
Significance of Clinton vs. Jones, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 8, 1997, at 12, col. 1-6; Rotunda. 
Can a President Be Imprisoned?, 20 LEGAL TIMES (OF WASHINGTON, D.C.) 22-23 (July 21. 
1997). However, my earlier writing mainly quoted from that case. Now I have investigated 
this issue fully. Based on my evaluation of the Constitutional history, the Constitutional 
language, legal precedent, the relevant statutes and case law, and the view of commentators, 
and I am reaching the conclusion of this legal opinion. 
110 
- U.S. at - . 117 S.Ct. at 1649. 
m - U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1649-50, citing and relying on, Rotunda, Presidents 
and Ex-Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. OF ILL. L. FORUM 1 (1975); 
1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANC~ & 
PROCEDURE§ 7.1 (West. Pub. Co., 2d ed. 1992) & 1997 Pocket Part. 
112 
113 
418 U.S. 683. 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41L.Ed.2d1039 (1974). 
Brief for the Respondent, Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, in 
(continued ... ) 
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1 v. Jones later rejected the argument that the uniqueness of the Presidential Office 
2 requires that the Court recognize some sort of immunity from the law. Clinton v. 
3 Jones held that, even if the burden of litigation is heavy, the Constitution gives the 
4 President no special redress from that burden. 
5 
6 If even aprivat,e party instituting civil litigation may impose special litigation 
7 burdens on a sitting President, then the President's argument for a relief from the 
8 burdens of litigation is much less when the Federal Government initiate·s a criminal 
9 case, where the public interest of justice is much greater114 because the party is the 
10 United States,116 and the action is criminal, not civil. 
11 
12 ARGUMENTS OF PRESIDENT NIXON AND OTHERS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS 
13 IMMUNE FROM THE CRIMINAL LAW. President Nixon's argument - that "any 
14 prosecutor and :grand jury would have within their power the ability to cripple an 
15 entire branch of the national government" - is inapplicable here. Neither "any'' 
16 prosecutor nor "any'' grand jury cannot institute criminal charges against a sitting 
17 President. The Independent Counsel Act does not authorize anyone to institute 
18 charges; it only gives its authority to the Independent Counsel, who can only be 
19 appointed if the Attorney General (who serves at the discretion of the President) asks 
20 the Special Division for an appointment. 
21 
22 Nor can it be ·argued that an indictment would close down the entire Executive 
23 Branch of the Federal Government. The President can continue his duties, and 'h 
24 federal court's exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly 
25 burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a 
26 violation of the Constitution. •-UG If the President is indicted, the government will not 
27 shut down, any more than it shut down when the Court ruled that the President must 
28 answer a civil suit brought by Paula Jones. 
29 
113 ( .•• continued) 
United States u. Nixon, Nos. 73-1766 & 73-1834 (October term, 1973), at p. 97. 
114 Recall, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 
(1982), the Court specifically noted that, when there is "merely a private suit for damages," 
then there is "a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in criminal 
prosecutions." 457 U.S. 731, 754 & n.37, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2703 & n.37. 
116 The Independent Counsel institutes its criminal litigation in the name of the 
United States. E.g., United States u. Webster Hubbell, et al., Crim. No. 98-0151 (JRJ). 
116 
- U.S. at-. 117 S.Ct. at 1648-49 (emphasis added). 
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1 President Clinton may well argue that a criminal indictment of the President 
2 would inevitably place the nation in turmoil and bring the entire government to a 
3 halt. Oddly enough, those same people argue that the solution is to impeach the 
4 President. Would not an impeachment place the nation in even more turmoil? 
5 
6 Moreover, this argument was rejected in Nixon v. Sirica, 117 which stated, over 
7 a quarter of a century ago, that the President "does not embody the nation's 
8 sovereignty. He is not above the law's commands . ... "118 A criminal proceeding 
9 would take no more time than a civil case against the President (and we know that 
10 is Constitutional). Moreover, any sanction if there is a conviction can be postponed 
11 until after the President is no longer a sitting President. 
1i 
13 In short, to the extent that case law discusses this issue, the cases do not 
14 conclude that the President should have any immunity, either absolute or temporary, 
15 from the law. On the contrary, they point to the conclusion that, since the birth of the 
16 Republic, our constitutional system rejected the fiction that the King can do no1 
17 wrong. In fact, in the Clinton v. Jones case, President Clinton himself specifically did 
18 not place any reliance on the claim. that the President enjoyed the prerogatives of a 
19 monarch.119 He has not stated that he would now embrace such a claim, and, if he 
20 did, there is no reason to believe that a court would accept that claim any more than 
21 the courts.accepted President Nixon's claims of immunity. 
22 
23 IMPEACHMENT, INDICTMENT, AND THE COMMENTATORS 
24 
117 
118 
487 F.2d 700, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(per curiam)(en bane). 
487 F.2d at 711: 
"Though the President is elected by nationwide ballot, and is often said 
to represent all the people, he does not embody the nation's sovereignty. 
He is not above the law's commands: With all its defects, delays and 
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving 
free government except that the Executive be under the law ... .' 
Sovereignty remains at all times with t he people, and they do not forfeit 
through elections the right to have the law construed against and 
apphed to every citizen." (footnotes omitted). 
In light of this case, it should be clear that the President is subject to a grand jury subpoena 
to give evidence. The President can, of course. plead the Fifth Amendment and refuse to 
testify, as could any other witness. 
119 
- U.S. at - n.24, 117 S.Ct. at 1646 n.24.-
NW: 16018 Docld: 70102162 Page 39 
r·· .. ~ .... ········ 
40 
1 A few commentators have questioned whether the impeachment process must 
2 be completed before an indictment can issue. No case has ever ruled that any officer 
3 subject to the criminal law must be impeached before he or she is prosecuted 
4 criminally. In fact, whenever the issue has been litigated, the cases have held that 
5 impeachment need not precede crimiilal indictment.1zo As early as 1796, when the 
6 Constitution and the nation were less than a decade old, Attorney General Lee 
7 advised Congress that a territorial court judge could be indicted for criminal offenses 
8 while in office although he had not been impeached. Lee, by the way, gave no 
9 suggestion that the President should be treated differently.121 
10 
11 There certainly is no suggestion in the language of the Constitution that the 
12 President is otherwise to be treated any differently than other civil officers. If the 
-13 Framers wanted to treat the President differently - for example, if they wanted to 
14 make sure that the President is immune from indictment until after he has been 
15 impeached - then they could have written such language. They certainly knew how 
16 to write such language. Our Constitution refers to "impeachment" several times, and 
17 creates no special rules for the President except it provides a different procedural rule 
18 in one specific instance: when the President is tried in the Senate, the Constitution 
19 provides that the Chief Justice of the United States (rather than the Vice President) 
120 As the Seventh Circuit noted in upholding the criminal conviction of Federal 
Judge Otto Kerner: 
"The Constitution does not forbid the trial of a federal judge for criminal 
offenses committed either before or after the assumption of judicial office. 
The provision of Art. I, § 3, cl. 7, that an impeached judge is 'subject to 
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according t.o Law' does not 
mean that a judge may not be indicted and tried without impeachment 
first. The purpose of the phrase may be to assure that after impeachment 
a trial on criminal charges is not foreclosed by the principle of double 
jeopardy, or it may be to differentiate the provisions of the Constitution 
from the English practice of impeachment." 
United States v. Jssaes, 493 F .2d 1124, 1142 (7'h Cir. 1974). Cf. Ronald D. Rotunda, 
/mpeiaching Federal J udges: Where Are We and Where Are We Going?, 72 J UDICATURE: THE 
J OURNAL OF THE AMERICAN J UDICATURE SOCIETY 359 (1989); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on 
the Constitutwnal Parameters of Federal Impeachment. 16 KENTUCKY LAW R EVIEW 707 (1988). 
12 1 3 H INDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE H OUSE OF R EPRESENTATIVES 982-83 (W ashingt.on, 
1907). 
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I presides over an impeachment trial.122 The Framers made the decision to treat the 
2 President differently on one issue only: they explicitly provided that the Chief Justice 
3 shall preside only in the case of a Presidential impeachment. 123 The Framers did not 
4 want the Vice President from presiding over the impeachment of the President 
5 because he would be in a conflict of interest: if the President were to be impeached, 
6 the Vice President would become President. 124 
7 
8 It is generally recognized, as Justice Joseph Story noted, that an impeachable 
9 offense is not limited to a criminal or statutory offense.125 Moreover, not all crimes 
IO are impeachable. To determine what are ''high crimes and misdemeanors" Justice 
11 Story advised that one must look to the common law, but it is not necessary to look 
12 to the list of statutory crimes. He added: 
13 
14 "Congress have unhesitatingly adopted the conclusion, 
15 that no previous [violation of] statute is necessary to authorize an 
16 impeachment for any official misconduct; and the rules of 
17 proceeding, and the rules of evidence, as well as the principles of 
18 decision, have been uniformly regulated by the known doctrines 
19 of the common law and parliamentary usage. In the few cases of 
122 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House has "sole Power of Impeachment"); ART. I, 
§ 3, c. 6 (Senate has "sole Power t.o try all lmpeachmen~" and, in an impeachment trial of the 
President, the Chief Justice shall preside); ART. I, § 3, cl. 7 (impeachment sanctions cannot 
impose criminal penalties, but criminal sanctions may be imposed by separate criminal trials); 
ART. II, § 4 ("all civil Officers of the United States" are subject t.o impeachment). 
123 One can look at quotations by various of the Framers of the Constitution, but, 
in "dealing with these historical materials a seriou~ danger exists of reading into statements 
made two hundred years ago a meaning not intended by the speaker." WATERGATE SPECIAL 
PROSECUTION FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from Richard Weinberg t.o Philip 
Lacovara, at 4. See also various memoranda attached to this Memorandum and marked as 
"confidential." 
This WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, Memorandum - after examining the 
historical record - concludes that the hist.orical sources of two centuries ago "are equivocal 
lending little firm support for or against the proposition that the Framers intended t.o 
. immunize a sitting President from criminal liability." Id. at 9. 
124 See discussion in, Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters 
of Federal Impeachment, 76 KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW 707 (1988). 
123 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, §§ 403·07, at pp. 287-
90 (RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds .. Carolina Academic Press, 19.87, originally 
published, 1833). 
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1 impeachment, which have hitherto been tried, no one of the 
2 charges has rested upon any statutable misdemeanour. It seems, 
3 then, to be the settled ·doctrine of the high court of impeachment, 
4 that though the common law cannot be a foundation of a 
5 jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or laws, that 
6 jurisdiction, when given, attaches, and is to be exercised 
7 according to the rules of the comm.on law; and that, woot are, and 
8 w"lwt are not high crimes and misdemeanours, is to be ascertained 
9 by a recurrence ro toot great basis of American jurisprudence."126 
10 
11 Story's judgement has stood the test of time. Impeachment charges have not 
12 been limited to violations of federal crimjnal statutes. Federal judges have been 
13 indicted before they are impeached.127 Indeed, to emphasize the distinction and 
14 separation of impeachment and criminal indictment, one judge was impeached after 
15 he had been acquitted in a criminal trial.128 
16 
126 JOSE:PHSTORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION,§§ 405, at p. 288 (RONALD 
D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, eds., Carolina Academic Press, 1987, originally published, 
1833)(emph~sis added). 
127 This has long been the rule. In 1796, Attorney General Lee informed Congress 
that a judge of a territ6rial court, a civil officer of the United States subject to impeachment, 
was indictable for criminal offenses while in office. 3 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 982-83 (Washington, 1907). The "Framers did not intend civil officers 
generally to be immune from criminal proces~." In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury 
Impaneled Dec. 9, 1972, Memorandum for the Unites States Concerning the Vice President's 
Claim of Constitutional Immunity, at p. 99, quoting 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra. 
For example, Judge Otto Kerner was indicted and convicted before there was any 
impeachment. His resignation ended the need for a subsequent impeachment. See United 
States u. Isaccs, 493 F.2d 1124, U.42 (7th Cir. 1974), citing the 1796 Attorney General Opinion 
upholding the conviction of Judge Kerner even though he had not been impeached and 
removed by Congress. Kerner then resigned from the bench and was not impeached. 
Judge Walter Nixon (who did not resign from the bench) was impeached after he was 
. convicted. See, Nixon u. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). 
128 J udge Alcee Hastings falls in this category. See, Hastings v. Judicial Conference 
of the United States, 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir . 1987). See generally, WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 
GRAND INQUESTS (1992). The House impeached Judge Hastings by a lopsided vote of 413 to 
3; the Senat;e removed him in 1989. Hastings was subsequently elected to the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Joe Davidson, Ex-Judge Is Likely To Join the Congress That Impeached 
Him, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 2, 1992, at Al, 1992 WESTLAW-WSJ 629646. 
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I INDICTABILITY OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. Similarly, hi.story demonstrates that 
2 the Vice President can be indicted and criminally prosecuted before being impeached 
3 (and whether or not he has been impeached). New Jersey, for example, indicted Vice 
4 President Aaron Burr for the death of Alexander Hamilton in a duel. 129 Burr did not 
5 act as if he were immunized from indictment. Instead, he fled the jurisdiction to 
6 avoid arrest.130 Burr continued functioning as Vice President while under indictment; 
7 in fact, Burr (as President of the Senate) even presided over the impeachment trial 
8 of Justice Chase.131 Vice President Spiro Agnew also argued, unsuccessfully, that he 
9 was immune from indictment prior to impeachment, but he ended up being indicted 
10 on corruption charges, pleading guilty, and resigning from offi.ce.132 
11 
12 President Clinton, like President Nixon, may wish to argue that the Presidency 
13 is "unique," and that the President alone represents "the Executive Branch." 
14 Consequently, it is argued, the President alone is immune from the criminal laws 
15 while he is sitting as President. 
16 
17 The Court, in Nixon v. Sirica, 133 explicitly rejected that argument. "Because 
18 impeachment is available against all 'civil Officers of the United States,' not merely 
19 against the President, U.S. Const. art. II,§ 4, it is difficult to understand how any 
20 immunities peculiar to the President can emanate by implication from the fact of 
21 i.mpeachability."134 A criminal indictment and even a trial do not "compete with the 
22 impeachment device by working a constructive removal of the President from 
23 o:ffi.oe."135 If the·President is acquitted, there is no "constructive removal" from office. · 
129 1 MILTON LOMASK, AARON BURR 329, 349.55 (1979). 
180 Id. 
181 See, WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSEClITION FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, 
from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara, at 29-30. 
132 
133 
134 
135 
E.g., RICHARD D. COHEN ,&JULESWITCOVER,AHEARTBEATAWAY (1974). 
487 F.2d at 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973)(per curiam)(en bane). 
487 F.2d at 711 n .50. 
487 F .2d a t 711: 
"Nor does the Impeachment Clause imply immunity from routine court 
process. While the President argues that the Clause means ·that 
impeachability precludes criminal prosecution of an incumbent, we see 
no need to explore t his question except to note its irrelevance to the case 
(continued ... ) 
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1 If the President is convicted, the punishment may not include imprisonment, and -
2 if it does - any imprisonment can be stayed until he no longer is a sitting President. 
3 
4 The test that Nixon v. Sirica adopted is directly applicable here. A criminal 
5 indictment and even a trial do not "compete with the impeachment device by working 
6 a constructive removal of the President from office." However, imprisonment may be 
7 a "constructive removal of the President from office," and, if it is, that sanction cannot 
8 be imposed on a sitting President. But indictment and trial are not the same as 
9 imprisonment. If there is a trial, the President may be acquitted. Ifhe is convicted, 
10 the sanction may not include imprisonment, and if it does, that sanction can be 
11 stayed until after the Presidential term has ended. 
12 
13 CONGRF.SSIONAL POWER TO CONTROL THE DECISION TO INDICT. If an official 
14 subject to impeachment (such as the President, Vice President, or a federal judge) 
15 could not be indicted until after he or she had been impeached, then Congress would 
16 control the decision whether to prosecute. But such a power would be inconsistent 
17 with the doctrine of separation of powers, which does not give Congress a role in the 
18 execution of the laws.136 
19 
20 The decision to prosecute or not prosecute is a decision that cannot lie with the 
21 legislature. In the instant case, it lies with the Independent Counsel, who, under the 
22 statute, stands1 in the shoes of the Attorney General. The decision to appoint the 
23 Independent Counsel rests in the unreviewable discretion of the Attorney General. 
24 The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that neither the courts nor Congress can 
25 require the appointment of an Independent Counsel.137 
26 
27 The decision to indict a sitting President lies with the Grand Jury, not with the 
28 House of Representatives or Senate. As Nixon v. Sirica eloquently stated: ''The 
29 federal grand jury is a constitutional fixture in its own right, legally independent of 
13~ ( ... continued) 
before us. The order ent.ered below, and approved here in modified form, 
is not a form of criminal process. Nor does it compete with the 
impeachment device by working a constructive removal of the President 
from office." 
487 F.2d 700 at 711(emphasis added). 
136 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714. 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). 
137 Morrison v. O~on, 487 U.S. 654, 694-95, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2621, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 
(1988). This point is discussed in detail in note 10, supra. 
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1 the Executive .... If a grand jury were a legal appendage of the Executive, it could 
2 hardly serve its historic functions as a shield for the innoc,ent and a sword against 
3 corruptwn in high places."138 The Court went on to state that, as "a practical, as 
4 opposed to legal matter, the Executive may, of course cripple a grand jury 
5 investigation,'' but even though the President may have the practical power to 
6 handicap the grand jury in various ways, "it is he who must exercise them. the court 
7 will not assume that burden by eviscerating the grand jury's independent legal 
8 authority."139 
9 
10 THEWATERGATEExPERIENCE. The Watergate Special Prosecution Force did 
11 not indict President Nixon but named him an unindicted coconspirator. President 
12 Nixon resigned from office, was pardoned by his successor, President Ford, and the 
13 issue was never tested in court. Some modem day commentators assume that the 
14 Watergate Special Prosecutor concluded that a sitting President is immune from 
15 indictment. That assumption is simply wrong. 
16 
17 The Watergate Special Prosecutor only argued that, in the narrow 
18 circumstances of that case - where the House of Representatives had already made 
19 the independent judgment to begin impeachment proceedings, when the House of 
20 Representatives, prior to any turnover of Grand Jury evid,ence, had independently 
21 decided to.consider the very matters that were before the· Grand Jury - the President 
22 should not be indicted until after the impeachment process had concluded.140 
138 487 F .2d at 712 n.54 (emphasis added)(internal citations omitted). 
189 487 F.2d at 713 n.54 (emphasis in original). 
uo See LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER 100 (1976). Jaworski argued 
that his Watergate Special Prosecution Force could seek an indictment against the President 
for some crimes (like murder), but, Jaworski said, he questioned whether it was appropriate 
to indict the President for other crimes, like obstruction of justice, "especially when the House 
Judiciary Committee was then engaged in an inquiry into whether the President should be 
impeached on that very ground." 
Of course, Jaworski's comments must be read in context. First, no case law reaches the · 
conclusion that Jaworski and other lawyers working for him reached at the time. His 
· ambivalent opinions are not legal precedent. 
More importantly, Jaworski's decision was quite nuanced. The distinctions he drew 
argue that an indictment would be appropriate in tl~e present case because no impeachment 
is under way. In addition, Jaworski conclusion that the President should not be indicted was 
tentative ("grave doubts," not firm conclusions), and those conclusions, he emphasized, were 
(continued ... ) 
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140 (. •• continued) 
made in the specific factual and historical context within which the Watergate Special 
Prosecution Force operated. That factual and historical context is different today. 
That factual and historical context is important. It is significant that the Watergate 
Special Prosecution Force was a very different animal than the present Office of Independent 
Counsel. Unlike the present Office of Independent C.Ounsel, the Watergate Special Prosecution 
Force was not a creature of statute. It was merely a creation of executive regulation. Until 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the issue, it was unclear if the courts could even rule on an 
evidentiary dispute between the Special Prosecutor and a "superior officer of the Executive 
Branch." United States v. Nixon, 94 U.S. 683, 692-93, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3100, 41L.Ed.2d1039 
(1974). The decision of the Wat.ergat.e Special Prosecutor not to seek to indict President Nixon 
was made in the context where even the powers of the Special Prosecutor to subpoena evidence 
from the President were unclear. I have examined the series of memoranda dealing with the 
issue of the amenability of President Nixon to indictment. The various memoranda are not of 
one opinion (some favored indictment), and they specifically raised concerned about the 
permissibility of an indictment brought by a Special Prosecutor who was appointed by, and 
could be fired by, the Attorney General, when the Special Prosecutor was protected only by a 
regulation signed by the Attorney General, and the validity of this entire arrangement had not 
been tested in court. See, WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 
1973, from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara, at 33-34. 
Significantly, the regulations that created the Watergate Special Prosecutor provided 
that the "Prosecutor will not be removed from his duties ... without the President's first 
consulting the ·Majority and . Minority Leaders and the Chairmen and ranking Minority 
Members of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives and 
ascertaining that their consensus is in accord with his proposed action." 38 FED. REG. 30739, 
quoted in, Unit,ed States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 n.8, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3101 n.8. The Nixon 
Court did not specifically rule on this provision. We know now that a law that gives Congress 
(or certain members of C.Ongress) a role in limiting the removal of executive branch officials is 
unconstitutional. As Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3186, 92 L.Ed.2d 
583 (1986) held: 
"The Cons:titution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the 
supervision of officers charged with execution of the laws its enacts .... Once the 
appointment has been made and confirmed, however, the Constitution explicitly 
provides for removal of Officers of the United States by Congress only upon 
impeachment .... A direct congressional role in the removal of officers charged 
with the execution of the laws beyond this limited one [of impeachment] is 
inconsistent with separation of powers." 
One could see why the Watergate Prosecutor was hesitant to claim a power to indict, 
when the very existence of the Watergate Prosecutor was constitutionally in doubt (a doubt 
· (continued ... ) 
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140 ( ••• continued) 
that bore fruit in Synar). No such doubt applies to the present Office of Independent Counsel, 
for Congress has no role t;o play in the removal of the Independent Counsel, and the Supreme 
Court has upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 
S.Ct. 2597, 101L.Ed.2d569 (1988). 
At the time that Jaworski wrote his tentative conclusions, the U.S. Supreme Court had. 
not even decided that a President could be sued for damages in a civil case. The Court later 
answered yes t;o that question in, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 
349 (1982). 
Moreover, the Memoranda on this issue show that the att.orneys in the Watergate 
Special Prosecution Force divided on this issue. E.g., WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION 
FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from Richard Weinberg to Philip Lacovara, at 43, 44: 
"The i.ssue i.s close. Respectable arguments derived from history and 
cont.emporary policy exist on both sides of the issue .... [M]y conclusion is that 
the Constitution does not preclude indictment, and the issue is really whether 
the incumbent President should be indicted." [emphasis added.] 
See al.so, JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 133 et seq. (Princeton University Press 
1996), reprinting his memorandum to Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox that argued that the 
President could be indicted. 
_ Commentators prior to Morrison v. Olson. The view of legal commentators 
regarding the indictment of a sitting President was mixed, prior to Morrison v. Olson. Those 
commentat.ors claiming that the President is immune from criminal prosecution have typically 
discussed the issue in a vacuum, not in the context of a specific investigation of a President 
pursuant to a statU!te, enacted at the President's request, authorizing a criminal investigation 
of the President. See George E. Danielson, Presidential Immunity from Criminal Prosecution, 
. 63 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1065 (1975) (arguing that the President is immune from criminal 
prosecution); PHILIP KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 135 (1978) (arguing that 
the President is immune from criminal prosecution). Note that these commentators wrote 
without benefit of the Supreme Court decision in, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 
2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). 
Other commentat.ors have argued that the President and all other officials are subject 
· to indictment prior to impeachment- in part because some acts may not be impeachable but 
are certainly indictable. See, RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 215 (2d ed. 1829): 
"the ordinary tribunals, as we shall see, are not precluded, either before or after 
impeachment, from taking cognizance of the public and official delinquency." 
(continued ... ) 
NW: 16018 Docld: 70102162 Page 47 
r . 
! ' 
1 
2 
48 
3 However, prior to that situation in the case where the House of 
4 Representatives had not already begun impeachmentprocess - historians forget that 
5 the Watergate Special Prosecution Force was advised that the President could be 
140 ( .•. continued) 
(emphasis added). 
Quoted in, w ATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, Memorandum of Dec. 26, 1973, from 
Richard Weinberg t.o Philip Lacovara. at 13. See also other authorities cited therein. Accord, 
JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 133 et seq. (Princeoon University Press 1996), 
reprinting his 1973 memorandum t.o Special Prosecut.or Archibald Cox arguing that President 
could be indicted. 
Commentators after Morrison v. Olson. Post-Morrison v. O/,son commentators have 
tended t.o conclude that the President is not above the law. See, Gary L. McDowell, Yes, You 
CM Indict the President, WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 9, 1998, at A19, col. 3-6 (Midwest ed.); 
Edwin B. Firmage & R.C. Man.grum, Removal of the President: Resignatwn and the Procedural 
Law of Impeachment, 1974 DuKE L.J. 1023 (arguing that President is not immune from the 
criminal process); Eric Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a President 
Immune from Criminal Prosecutwn Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS CONST.L.Q. 7 (1992) 
(thorough article concluding that the President is not immune); Terry Eastland, The Power to 
Control Prosecutwn, 2 Nexus 43, 49 (Spring, 1997)(referring to Morrison v. Olson and 
concluding that the President is not immunized from prosecution); Eric M. Freedman, 
Achieving Political Adulthood, 2 NEXUS 67, 84 (Spring, 1997), concluding: 
"To the extent that the belief that the President should have a blanket 
immunity from criminal prosecutions manifests itself in legal form, legal 
decisionmakers should reject it. The argument is inconsistent with the history, 
structure, and underlying philosophy of our government, at odds with precedent, 
and unjustified by practical considerations." 
See also, Scott W. Howe, The Prospect of a President Incarcerated, 2 NEXUS 86 (Spring, 1997), 
arguing that the President has no constitutional immunity from criminal prosecution, but 
Congress may wish to create some limited immunity by statute. 
Jay S. Bybee, Who Executes the Executioner?, 2 NEXUS 53 (Spring, 1997) argues that 
before the President, or federal judges, can be tried, they first must be impeached, an 
argument that is more in the nature of a polemic, because it uproots two centuries of practice 
regarding the prosecution of federal judges. See also Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The. 
PresU:lential Privilege Against Prosecutwn, 2 NEXUS 11 (Spring, 1997), which prnsents such a 
broad argument for Presidential immunity that it is inconsistent with Clinton v. Jones, - U.S. 
- . 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997). 
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1 indicted. 141 
2 
3 USE OF GRAND JURY TO COLLECT EVIDENCE FOR AN IMPEACHMENT. 
4 
5 INTRODUCTION. If it is unconstitutional for a federal grand jury, acting 
6 pursuant to the Independent Counsel statute to indict a President for engaging, in 
7 his private capacity, in serious violations of federal law, then it would be a gross 
8 abuse of the grand jury powers and a violation of federal statutory and constitutional 
9 law for that grand jury to investigate whether the President has committed any 
10 criminal law violations. But we know, after Morrison v. Olson,142 that it is 
11 constitutional for the Independent Counsel to use the grand jury to investigate the 
12 · President. That conclusion was implicit in the holding of Morrison. Hence it should 
13 be constitutional to indict a sitting President because it would not be constitutional 
14 to use the grand jury to investigate if it could not constitutionally indict. 
15 
16 Let us analyze this argument in more detail. First, as all the legal 
17 commentators acknowledge: 
18 
19 "The grand jury is authorized only to conduct criminal investigations. 
20 Accordingly, it is universally acknowledged that the grand jury cannot 
21 be used to conduct an investigation - or even explore a particular line 
22 of inquiry - solely in order to collect evidence for civil purposes."143 
23 
· 24 Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, the federal government may not "start 
25 or continue a grand jury inquiry where no criminal prosecution seem[s] likely."144 If 
26 the grand jury investigation "is merely a pretext for a civil evidence-gathering 
w JOHN HART ELY, ONCONSI'ITimONALGROUND 133 et·seq. (Princeton University · 
Press 1996), reprinting his: Memorandum to Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox on the Legality 
of Calling President Nixon before a Grand Jury (1973). · Professor Ely explains that 
"prosecution of a sitting (non-impeached) president must be possible, or else there would be no 
way to reach" crimes that do not rise t.o the level of impeachment. Id. at 139. Ely expanded on 
those arguments in id. at 140-41. 
142 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). 
143 2 SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.0 l 
at 2 (Callaghan & Co., 1986)(emphasis added). 
144 United States v. Sells Engineering Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 432, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3142, 
77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983). See also, 2 SA~A SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW 
AND PRACTICE§ 10.14 at 51 (Callaghan & Co., 1986) 
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1 mission, the grand jury process is clearly being abused under any standard."146 
2 
3 There are few cases where the courts have found that the Government has 
4 abused the grand jury system in order to gain evidence that would or could not be 
5 used in a criminal prosecution. But, where the courts find a bad motive, they do not 
6 allow an illegal use of the grand jury system. 
7 
8 In the present case, it is quite clear that one of the purposes of the grand jury 
9 investigation conducted by the Office of Ind.ependent Counsel is to investigate 
10 President Clinton. Of course, the OIC and the grand jury· have other persons whom 
11 it is investigating and whom it may indict (or already have indicted). And, to that 
12 extent, the actions of the several Grand Juries in this investigation are proper. 
13 Morever, to the extent that it is conducting a valid criminal investigation, it may 
14 disclose the fruits of its investigation for civil purposes to the extent that statutes or 
15 rules governing such disclosure so authorize.148 
16 
17 However, in this case it is clear that some of the grand jury's subpoenas, some 
18 of the energy of the OIC, and a portion of the mandate of the OIC are intended solely 
19 to investigate criminal allegations against the President in connection with issues 
20 such as Whitewater, Castle Grande, the FBI White House files, the alleged illegal 
21 abuses involving the Travel Office of the White House, and - most recently -
22 allegations involving possible Presidential perjury, subordination of perjury, 
23 tampering of witnesses, and obstruction of justice in the litigation captioned as Jones 
24 v. Clinton. 
25 
26 The purpose of the OIC investigation and the grand jury investigation is to 
27 determine whether the President has, or has not, engaged in serious crimes. If the 
28 grand jury .cannot indict the President for such crimes, then it has no business 
29 investigating the President's role in such crimes. Impeachment, after all, is an 
146 2 SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE§ 8.03 
. at 9 (Callaghan & Co., 1986). 
See also Unit.ed St,at,es v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 57-58 (D. N.J. 1960). 
This case was on remand from, Unit.ed States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78 S.Ct. 
983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), and it applied the test adopted in that case. 
146 E.g., United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476. 103 S .Ct. 3164, 77 L.Ed.2d 785 
(1983); R ULE 6(E), FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMl~AL PROCEDURE. 
NW: 16018 Docld: 70102162 Page 50 
r 
I 
I 
51 
1 admittedly nnncrirninal proceeding.147 If the purpose of the grand jury investigation 
2 of President Clinton is not to indict even if the evidence commands indictment (or if 
3 its :purpose is simply to investigate possible impeachable offenses on behalf of the 
4 House of Representatives and then turn over this information to the House), then, in 
5 either case, the grand jury is being misused.148 
6 
7 WHEN THE GRAND JURY IS USED TO TURN OVER INFORMATION TO ANOTHER 
8 UNIT OF GoVERNMENT. It would be wrong, for example, to use the grand jury solely 
9 to gather information to be used by another governmental unit. If the grand jury is 
10 investigating in good faith to determine if the President has engaged in any criminal 
11 conduct, it may turn over, to the House of Representatives, information that it has 
12 gathered in its investigation of alleged criminality that also is relevant to the House 
13 even if the grand jury ultimately concludes that it is not relevant to a criminal 
14 inquiry, 
15 
16 The important point is that the grand jury must act in good faith and not as 
17 the agent of another entity of the government. "It is sufficient if the agencies are 
18 engaged in good faith investigations within their respective jurisdictions, and that 
19 one agency is .not simply serving as a cat's paw for another, under the pretext of 
20 conducting its own investigati.on."149 Grand Juries cannot be used as a short cut for 
21 the House. of Representatives to collect information that otherwise would be more 
.22 difficult to secure. 150 The OIC cannot use the grand jucy to investigate alleged 
.23 criminal activity by the President if an indictment (assuming that the evidence 
24 warranted it) is "merely an unexpected bare possibility."151 The OIC (which sits in 
25 the shoes of the Attorney General) must have an open mind whether to seek an 
26 indictment, but it cannot have an open mind about this issue if it would be illegal or 
1
" E.g., the sanction cannot result in imprisonment or fine. The standard of proof 
is not beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no jury of twelve people drawn from the general 
public. An impeachment and removal do not prevent a criminal prosecution. 
148 On the other hand, it would be proper to turn over information secured in good 
faith for purposes of securing an indictment but that is also relevant to impeachment. 
149 2 SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02 
at 6 (Callaghan & Co., 1986), citing, United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 
58 (D. N.J . 1960). 
1110 United States u. Proctor & Gamb/.e Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683-84, 78 S.Ct. 983, 987, 
2 L.Ed.2d (1957). 
161 United States v. Proctor & Gamb/.e Co., 187 F. Supp. 55, 58 (0. N.J. 1960). 
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l unconstitutional to indict the President.152 
2 
3 In other words, if the statute creating the OIC and authorizing it to investigate 
4 the President and turn over relevant information to the House of Representatives 
5 does not authorize or permit the OIC to seek an indictment of the President, the 
6 statute is authorizing an abuse of the grand jury powers, an unconstitutional 
7 perversion of the Fifth Amendment, which created the grand jury. It is clearly 
8 improper to use the grand jury, a creature of the criminal process, to collect evidence 
9 for noncriminal purposes. It is unconstitutional to use the grand jury solely as a tool 
10 of a House impeachment inquiry to investigate in an area where it could not indict 
11 even if the evidence warranted an indictment. 
12 
13 WHEN THE GRAND JURY IS USED TO INVESTIGATE A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 
14 WHO CANNOT BE INDICTED FOR A CRIME BECAUSE HE ALREADY HAs BEEN 
15 INDICTED. It is. improper for the Government to use the grand jury to investigate a 
16 target's role in a matter after the grand jury has indicted the target. If the grand jury 
17 has already indicted a target, it is an abuse of the grand jury system to use the grand 
18 jury to investigate further on that matter. Because the grand jury cannot indict the 
19 target on the matter in question - the target, after all, has already been indicted -
20 it cannot use its investigatory powers to further investigate the target. 163 
21 
22 That logic applies here too. If the grand jury cannot indict the target (because 
23 be :is President) then it cannot use its investigatory powers to further investigate the 
24 target. 
1112 Grand Jury Presentments. In some instances, .a Grand Jury can issue a 
report, a "presentment'' without issuing any indictments. But such a Grand Jury is 
investigating alleged criminal activities and could i.ndict. Even in these circumstances, civil 
libertarians have raised serious objections to such presentments. 
No Grand Jury should be the alter ego of the House Judiciary Committee or any other 
House entity investigating possible ilnpeachment. The House of Representatives has the "sole" 
power to impeach [U.S. CONITT., ART. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House has "sole Power oflmpeachment")] and 
should not treat the Office of Independent Counsel as its alter ego or tool. 
153 E.g., United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 
U.S. 845, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 50 (1964); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duce& Tecum Dated 
January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985)(To protect the grand jury from 
being "abused," where defendant makes a "strong showing that the government's dominant 
purpose [in issuing a subpoena) was pretrial preparation," for an already pending indictment 
the court will quash the subpoena. In this case, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court 
and quashed the subpoena.) See also In re National Window Glass Workers, 287 F. 219 (N.D. 
Ohio 1922). 
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I WHEN THE GRAND JURY IS USED TO INVESTIGATE A MATTER WHERE IT 
2 WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL To INDICT. As discussed above, the Speech or 
., 3 Debate Clause gives an absolute constitutional privilege that will protect a Member 
4 of Congress from being questioned about his or her vote on a legislative matter. 
5 Assume that a grand jury was investigating a matter where it could not 
6 constitutionally indict, given the narrow, but absolute protections of the Speech or 
7 Debate Clause. It would be unconstitutional for the grand jury to inquire into 
8 matters where it could not constitutionally indict.154 If the grand jury cannot 
9 constitutionally :indict for particular actions because of the Speech or Debate Clause, 
l 0 then it cannot constitutionally ask questions regarding this matter. 165 Courts should 
11 "not hesitate to limit the grand jury's investigative power in deference to this 
12 congressional privilege."1116 
13 
14 If the grand jury cannot indict the President (because it would be 
15 unconstitutional to do so), then the Independent Counsel certainly cannot use the 
16 grand jury to investigate President Clinton. If the President is somehow immune 
17 from indictment and above the law, then the grand jury (whether in Arkansas or in 
18 Washington, D"C. or elsewhere) would be acting unconstitutionally, as would the 
19 federaI trial judges who supervise these Grand Juries. If it is unconstitutional to 
20 indict the President, it is unconstitutional for the grand jury to investigate him. 
21 
22 Bu~. we know that it is constitutional for the Independent Counsel to 
23 investigat.e the President to det.ermine if he should be indict.ed for criminal acts. That 
24 was what Morri.son v. Olson 157 was all about. 
25 
26 Morrison upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act. · That 
27 case decided, irµplicitly, that it must be constitutional to indict the President if the 
28 evidence warrants and demands such an indictment. That conclusion was implied 
29 in the holding of Morrison v. Olson, and it explains why the Court later issued its 
. 30 strong language in Clinton v. Jones , rejecting the notion that the federal judiciary's 
31 exercise of jurisdiction over the President creates a problem of separation of powers. 
111
' Grauel u. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628-29, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2628-29, 33 
L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). 
1116 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 n.18. 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2629 n.18, 33 
L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). 
uis PAUl. S. DIAMOND , FEDERAL G RAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCED URE § 6.04 at 
6-3 1 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1995). See also id. at§ 4.0l[D]. 
1117 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988). 
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1 ''The fact that a federal court's exercise of its traditional Article Ill 
2 jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of 
3 the Chi.ef Executive is not suffici.ent to establish a violation of the 
4 Constitution. '"58 
5 
6 As discussed above, distinguished Constitutional scholar, former Federal 
7 Judge, and former Yale Law Professor Robert Bork concluded, in a famous 
8 Memorandum he filed when he was Solicitor General of the United States, that 
9 Federal prosecutors could investigate and indict a sitting Vice President. It is 
l O noteworthy to recall the first sentence of that Memorandum: 
11 
12 "The motion by the Vice President [Spiro T. Agnew] poses 
13 a grave and unresolved constitutional issue: whether the Vice 
14 President of the United States is subject to federal grand jury . 
15 investigation and possible indictment and trial while still in 
16 offi.ce."169 
17 
18 Solicitor General Bork properly concluded that, if the Vice President could not be 
19 indicted, the grand jury could not subject him to an investigation. Because, he 
20 concluded, the grand jury could constitutionally indict the Vice President, therefore 
21 it could constitutionally investigate the Vice President. 
22 
23 CONCLUSION 
24 
25 We must keep in mind the following: 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 ... 
1118 
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson upholding 
the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act and the authority 
it besrows on a gran~ jury t;o investigate criminal charges involving the 
President of the United States; 
the decision of President Clinton to lobby for and sign this legislation 
with full knowledge that a prime focus of that Act would be allegations 
surrounding his own conduct; 
the decision of Congress not · to enact any legislation conferring 
- U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 1648-49 (emphasis added). 
m In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury lmpane/,ed December 5, 1972, Application 
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965, 
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice Presiden t's Claim of Constitutional 
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 1. 
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immunity from -crimjnal prosecution but, on the contrary, to enact 
legisl~tion to create the Office of Independent Cm,msel to investigate 
allegations of criminal conduct involving President Clinton; 
the legislative history of the law creating an Independent Counsel 
indicating specifically that Congress did not intend to bestow any 
criminal immunity to any person covered by that Act; 
President Clinton's full knowledge that the Act's fust court-appointed 
counsel would. be specifically charged with investigating President 
Clinton; 
. the decision of President ·Clinton's Attorney General to petition the 
Special Division to appoint such an Independent Counsel; 
.. the subsequent decision of President Clinton's Attorney General on 
several occasions to petition the Special Division to expand the 
jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel to include other allegations of 
criminal conduct involving President Clinton. 
the counts of an indictment against President Clinton would include 
serious allegations involving witness tampering, document destruction, 
perjury, subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, conspiracy, and 
illegal pay-offs - counts that in no way relate to the President 
Clinton's official duties, even though some of the alleged violations 
occurred after he became President. 
These factors all buttress and lead to the same conclusion: it is proper, 
constitutional, and legal for a federal grand jury to indict a sitting President for 
serious criminal acts that are not part of, and are contrary to, the President's official 
duties. In this country, no one, even President Clinton, is above the law. 
28 This conclusion does not imply that a President must be required to serve an 
29 actual prison term before he leaves office. The defendant President could remain free 
30 pending bis trial, 160 and the trial court could defer any prison sentence until he leaves 
31 office.161 The defendant-President may petition the courts to exercise its discretion 
32 in appropriate cases. It is one thing for the President to petition the court to exercise 
33 its discretion; i t is quite another for the President to announce that he is above the 
34 law and immune from criminal prosecution. 
35 
160 The re is, after a ll, no risk of flight to avoid prosecut ion. 
161 See Ronald D. Rotunda, When Duty Calls, Courts Can Be Flexible, WASHINGTON 
POST, January 29, 1997, at p. A21, col. 2-3. 
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Before or after indictment, Congress could exercise its independent judgment 
as to whether to begin impeachment proceedings or await the conclusion of the 
criminal proceedings. 162 Or, if Congress did not wish to postpone the impeachment 
proceedings, Congress if it wished (and if the President agreed), could ask the 
Independent Counsel to delay the criminal trial. The President could also petition 
the court to stay or postpone the criminal trial until the impeachment proceedings 
were concluded. 
~. 
Neither the criminal proceeding nor the impeachment proceeding will control 
the other. As Solicitor General Bork pointed out a quarter of a century ago: 
"Because the two processes have different objects, the 
considerations relevant to one may not be relevant to the other." 
For that reason, neither conviction nor acquittal in one trial, though it may he 
persuasive, need automatically determine the result in the other trial."163 
And, the House or Senate may conclude that "a particular offense, thoug:h 
properly punishable in the courts. did not warrant" either impeachme·nt or removal 
from office. 164 
Sincerely, 
Ronald D. Rotunda 
ALBERT E. JENNER, JR. PROFESSOR OF LAW 
m Of course. if Congress decides to institute impeachment proceedings. it will 
decide whether a penalty is to be imposed, and, if so, what penalty is appropriate (e.g., removal 
from office, or a lesser penalty, such as a public censure). 
163 In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application 
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965, 
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional 
Immunity, Oct. 5, 1973, at p. 9 (Robert Bork, Solicitor General). 
164 In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application 
of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, Case Number Civil 73-965, 
Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitution.al 
NW: 16018@ooldtt90000156lm'~get5i:i 9 (Robert Bork, Solicitor General) . 
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